Constructing Class Action Reality by Bassett, Debra Lyn
BYU Law Review
Volume 2006 | Issue 6 Article 1
12-18-2006
Constructing Class Action Reality
Debra Lyn Bassett
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Litigation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Debra Lyn Bassett, Constructing Class Action Reality, 2006 BYU L. Rev. 1415 (2006).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2006/iss6/1
BASSETT.MRO.DOC 1/20/2007 1:04:49 PM 
 
1415 
Constructing Class Action Reality 
 Debra Lyn Bassett∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Class actions have become quite controversial.1 We regularly hear 
class actions criticized as a form of “extortion”2 or “legalized 
blackmail.”3 Politicians and some commentators routinely denounce 
law, lawyers, and class actions all in the same breath, as if all were 
uniformly and universally unfair, unethical, and out of control4—all 
 
          ∗  Loula Fuller and Dan Myers Professor of Law, Florida State University College of 
Law; dbassett@law.fsu.edu. Many thanks to Rex Perschbacher and Mark Seidenfeld for their 
insightful comments on a previous draft, and to Jared Sine and the editors of the BYU Law 
Review for their helpful editing suggestions. I am grateful to Florida State University College 
of Law for its generous research assistance. 
 1. John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private 
Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (2005) (“Recent surveys indicate growing 
public distrust of the class action device. . . . [C]lass actions are now widely perceived as little 
more than a money generator for attorneys.”); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” 
and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1377, 1377 (2000) (stating that class settlements are “the most controversial subject in the 
civil process today”). 
 2. See, e.g., Greg Burns & Michael J. Berens, The Class Action Game, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 
7, 2004, at C1 (stating that large corporations refer to class actions as “a legal extortion 
racket”); Michael J. Flaherty, Debt Collection: Know the Fair Debt Law and Follow It, A.B.A. J., 
May 1999, at 73 (stating that class action settlements can “become exercises in extortion”); 
Michael Katz, Hush Money, FORBES, Mar. 19, 2001, at 52 (describing a proposed—but 
subsequently withdrawn—class action settlement as “extortion”). 
 3. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 
F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[C]lass actions create the opportunity for a kind of legalized 
blackmail . . . .”); Michelle Singletary, In Class Actions, a Litany of Frustrations, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 14, 1999, at A20 (quoting a press release from DaimlerChrysler Vice President Lew 
Goldfarb as stating that class actions were “a form of legalized blackmail”); Donald Young, 
Plan Would Enrich Lawyers, USA TODAY, June 20, 2001, at 16A (analogizing “expensive 
class-action litigation” to “legalized blackmail”). Analogizing class actions to legalized 
blackmail is not new; the analogy has floated around for at least three decades. See Milton 
Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The Twenty-
Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (characterizing consumer 
class actions as “legalized blackmail”); Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and 
Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 842, 843 (1974). 
 4. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Curbs on Class Action Lawsuits Urged, WASH. POST, June 
12, 2003, at A6 (addressing proposal to change the law “to make it harder to file class action 
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part and parcel of the same litigation “explosion.”5 Of course, there 
isn’t any litigation explosion6—but that does not stop the allegations 
or the anti-lawyer, anti-class action sentiment.7 
 
lawsuits” and stating that “lawmakers need to limit trial lawyers’ ability to seek courts—
generally at the state level—that might be especially sympathetic to class action suits”); 
Matthew Mosk, Suits Challenge Retroactive Laws, WASH. POST, June 7, 2000, at B4 (“Earlier 
this year, Maryland legislators said the greed of trial lawyers had driven them to support a series 
of laws that effectively shielded HMOs, cable companies and other corporate interests from 
potentially huge class-action judgments.”); William Spielberger, Lawyers, Shakespeare and a 
Desperate Man, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 22, 2005, § 1, at 17 (In the last presidential election, 
“crowds were urged to support tort reform, restrict class actions, limit liability awards, stop 
‘frivolous lawsuits,’ roll back civil-rights protections. And who was standing in the way of these 
reformations of our laws? That’s easy—the trial lawyers!”); William Tucker, Why We Should 
Decriminalize Crime, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 29 (“There is no Association of 
the Trial Lawyers of America pushing the interests of civil defendants in Congress. Plaintiff 
work attracts all the professional excitement, as attorneys constantly mine new ground for 
malpractice and class-action suits. As usual, the law schools and professional associations follow 
suit.”); id. (noting the “greed . . . of the legal profession”); Jim VandeHei, GOP Plans New 
Caps on Court Awards, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2002, at A5 (“President Bush and his 
congressional allies in the past two years have written into federal law new limits on the 
public’s ability to sue . . . . Sen. Trent Lott . . . said in an interview that trial lawyers, who he 
likened to a ‘pack of wolves,’ . . . [were bringing] ‘outlandish class-action lawsuits.’”). 
 5. Claims regarding the litigious nature of American society are asserted both generally 
and with respect to virtually every sort of specific type of lawsuit imaginable. See, e.g., Thomas 
Adcock, Lawyers Without Clients, LEGAL TIMES, June 9, 2003, at 43 (referring to the United 
States as “perhaps the most litigious society the world has ever known”); Christopher S. 
Burnside et al., Mold Spores: Bad Science or Bad Dream?, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 18, 2002, at B13 
(asserting that “[m]old is the next litigation explosion”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act: Coming Litigation Crisis, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 10, 2003, at B8 (warning that Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act will result in litigation crisis due to increased securities litigation); see also Debra Lyn 
Bassett, When Reform Is Not Enough: Assuring More than Merely “Adequate” Representation in 
Class Actions, 38 GA. L. REV. 927, 927 n.3 (2004) (providing additional examples). 
 6. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know 
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. 
REV. 4, 5 (1983) (noting that “per capita rates of litigation in United States courts fall in the 
same general range as those of England, Australia, Ontario (Canada) and others”); Marc 
Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 6–7, 38 (1986) 
(concluding that the empirical data does not support claims of a litigation explosion); Marc S. 
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and 
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) (noting that the number of federal and 
state trials peaked in the mid-1980s and have declined ever since); Deborah L. Rhode, 
Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 
DUKE L.J. 447, 456 (2004) (“Scholars have debunked [the] claim [that the United States is 
experiencing an escalating epidemic of litigation and has become ‘the world’s most litigious 
nation’] so often that it is startling how much bunk survives.”); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really 
Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1147, 1154–68 (1998) (stating that the claims of a litigation explosion are anecdotal and 
overblown). 
BASSETT.MRO.DOC 1/20/2007 1:04:49 PM 
1415] Constructing Class Action Reality 
 1417 
This controversy regarding class actions has brought calls for 
reexamination and reform. As one might expect, legislative 
reforms—both proposed and enacted—have sought “quick fixes” for 
perceived problems and shortcomings in class action practice.8 More 
surprisingly, the calls for reexamination in the academic legal 
literature have proffered proposals that not only contradict the 
historical understanding of class actions, but indeed erode and 
undermine the very foundation of the theoretical justification for 
class actions—and thus seek not merely innovation or reform, but 
actually seek to construct a new class action reality. Moreover, these 
recent proposals seek to construct this new class action reality in a 
remarkably uniform manner—and one that raises significant 
constitutional issues. Specifically, this reconstruction of class action 
reality pits two inherent components of class actions against each 
other: one that focuses on the representative nature of the class 
action device, and one that focuses on the aggregate, or efficiency, 
component of class actions. 
Both aggregation and representativeness are inherent to class 
actions. “Aggregation”—the bringing together of multiple claims in 
a single lawsuit for reasons of judicial economy—is, of course, the 
primary underlying rationale for the class action device. A class action 
permits numerous claims to be adjudicated simultaneously without 
the need for each individual class member to institute a separate 
lawsuit. But class actions are more than merely large-scale 
aggregation devices. As shown in both the historical development of 
 
 7. See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1269–70 (2005). 
A persistent and well-funded campaign depicts American civil justice as a 
pathological system, presided over by arrogant activist judges and driven by greedy 
trial lawyers, biased juries, and claimants imbued with victim ideology who bring 
frivolous lawsuits with devastating effects on the nation’s health care system and 
economic well-being. Although the available evidence overwhelmingly refutes these 
assertions, this set of beliefs, supported by folklore and powerfully reinforced by 
media coverage, has become the reigning common sense. 
Id. (citing WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW (2004)). 
 8. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1453, 1711–1715 (2005)) (having a primary purpose of shifting many 
class actions from state court to federal court); see also Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, 
H.R. 420, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc 
.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h420rh.txt.pdf (proposed legislation that would render 
Rule 11 sanctions mandatory and would limit venue options in both state and federal courts). 
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class actions and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,9 as a general 
matter, a judgment involving aggregated claims binds only the 
named parties. To bind the entire class—both the named and 
unnamed class members—a representative component must be 
satisfied. “Representativeness” is the due process requirement that 
the interests of the unnamed class members be adequately 
represented by those participating in the lawsuit. This representative 
component acts as a constraint on class actions’ aggregation 
component—in recognition of the relinquishment of their day in 
court, only those unnamed class members who were adequately 
represented will be bound by the class judgment. 
Part II sets out an overview of the core theoretical guideposts of 
this Article—the linguistic and the accompanying substantive 
distinctions between a “representative” versus an “aggregate” 
foundation and focus in constructing class action reality.10 Part III 
explores some of the historical underpinnings to the class action 
device.11 Part IV examines and analyzes the descriptive terminology 
used in the United States Supreme Court’s class action case law.12 
Finally, Part V analyzes the important distinctions between an 
“aggregate” and a “representative” construction of class actions, 
examines some of the proposals from prominent voices in the 
academy, and explains why the current trend toward an “aggregate” 
construction—despite leading to some innovative and interesting 
analytical approaches—would yield a new, and undesirable, class 
action reality.13 
II. OVERVIEW: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A “REPRESENTATIVE” 
VERSUS “AGGREGATE” FOCUS 
Class actions unquestionably have both a “representative” 
component and an “aggregate” component. A class action proceeds 
 
 9. See infra notes 64–127 and accompanying text (discussing the historical 
development of class actions and the Supreme Court’s class action jurisprudence). 
 10. See infra notes 14–63 and accompanying text (examining distinctions between a 
“representative” focus and an “aggregate” focus). 
 11. See infra notes 64–89 and accompanying text (reviewing historical background of 
the class action device). 
 12. See infra notes 90–127 and accompanying text (analyzing the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence with respect to a “representative” versus an “aggregate” focus). 
 13. See infra notes 128–222 and accompanying text (analyzing the implications of a 
new class action reality shifting to an “aggregate” focus). 
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through the use of one or more named plaintiffs14 who serve as class 
representatives and who represent the interests of all class members, 
both present and absent.15 A class action also involves claims of 
individuals that are heard together, or aggregated, into a single 
lawsuit. Despite the existence of this aggregation component, class 
actions traditionally have emphasized the representative component, 
because it is this representative feature that provides the due process 
basis for binding absent class members to the class judgment. 
Indeed, an emphasis on the representative nature has been the 
hallmark of class actions since their inception.16 The promulgation of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, followed closely by the 
1940 United States Supreme Court decision in Hansberry v. Lee,17 
firmly established adequate representation as central to the legitimacy 
of class actions. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,18 
 
 14. Defendant classes are also possible, but are far less common. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties . . . .”) 
(emphasis added); 1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS  
§ 3:2, at 215–16 (4th ed. 2002) (“Another type of class is the defendant class. An individual or 
a class plaintiff may sue a named defendant as representative of a class of other defendants 
similarly situated.”); see also Robert R. Simpson & Craig Lyle Perra, Defendant Class Actions, 
32 CONN. L. REV. 1319, 1322–23 (2000) (noting defendant class actions are rare). Indeed, a 
plaintiff class may sue a defendant class. See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1770, at 481–86 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing problems that arise 
when defendant class is being sued by plaintiff class). 
 15. The Supreme Court has suggested that the adequacy of representation requirement 
in class actions takes its root from the “historic tradition that everyone should have his own day 
in court.” Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 & n.2 (1989) (quoting 18 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 4449, at 417 (1st ed. 1981)), 
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 
1076 as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). Several 
commentators have expressed disagreement with the “day in court” model as applied to class 
actions. See Susan P. Koniak, How Like a Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied 
Adequate Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1787, 1855 (2004) (“Virtual 
representation in a class action, along with others similarly situated, is simply not equivalent to 
one’s day in court. That’s fine with me.”); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party 
and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 923 (1998) (arguing that the “day in court” model 
distorts class action analysis). The validity (or invalidity) of the “day in court” model is not 
necessary to my analysis, and I leave it to another day. 
 16. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832 (1999) (“[R]epresentative suits have 
been recognized in various forms since the earliest days of English law.” (citing generally 
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS 
ACTION (1987))); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1328 (8th ed. 2004) (defining 
“representative action” as “class action”). 
 17. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
 18. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Rule 23, of course, is not the exclusive path to class actions, 
which also can be brought under, for example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
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which authorizes class actions in the federal courts, frames its 
authorization in terms of adequate representation.19 In Hansberry, 
the Supreme Court held that adequate representation was not merely 
one of four prerequisites to maintaining a class action, but instead 
equated adequate representation with due process.20 This seminal 
case served as the critical moment for the emergence of class actions 
as we know them today. Since Hansberry, the Supreme  
Court repeatedly has reaffirmed adequate representation  
as the decisive determinant of a class judgment’s binding effect.21 
Thus, the theoretical and constitutional underpinnings of class 
actions are linked to their representative character, a point  
widely acknowledged by traditional terminology. The leading class 
action treatise, for example, states, “The fundamental nature of a 
class suit is its representative status,”22 and both case law23 and 
 
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 
(2000) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)). Class actions are also permitted under state law in 
almost all states. 
 19. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties . . . .”). 
 20. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45. 
 21. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 22. 1 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 14, § 1:2, at 14; see id. § 1:1, at 2 (“Class actions 
are representative suits on behalf of groups of persons similarly situated.”); see also CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 510 (6th ed. 2002) 
(“[A class action] provides a means by which, when a large group of persons are interested in a 
matter, one or more may sue or be sued as representatives of the class without needing to join 
every member of the class.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Citizens Banking Co. v. Monticello State Bank, 143 F.2d 261, 264 (8th 
Cir. 1944) (“This is properly an instance for application of the ‘class’ or ‘representative’ action 
authorized by Rule 23(a).”); see also Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 
(1853) (“In all cases where . . . a few are permitted to sue and defend on behalf of the many, 
by representation, care must be taken that persons are brought on the record fairly 
representing the interest or right involved, so that it may be fully and honestly tried. . . . The 
legal and equitable rights and liabilities of all being before the court by representation, and 
especially where the subject-matter of the suit is common to all, there can be very little danger 
but that the interest of all will be properly protected and maintained.”); Hess v. Anderson, 
Clayton & Co., 20 F.R.D. 466, 479–80 & n.29 (S.D. Cal. 1957) (citing Smith v. Swormstedt, 
supra, as “one of the oldest cases on the subject” and stating that in Swormstedt, “after 
referring to the fact that class actions are exceptions to the rule which requires that an action 
be instituted only on behalf or against persons who are actually before the court . . . states that 
it is the function of the court to insure that the persons before the court truly represent the 
rights to be adjudicated”); id. at 479 (“I am of the view that in any one of the three forms of 
actions allowed, (1) the ‘true’ form of class action, (2) the ‘hybrid’ form or (3) the ‘spurious’ 
class action, the court must be satisfied that the persons before it will fairly insure adequate 
representation of all.”). 
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commentary24 have traditionally used the term “representative” to 
describe class actions. 
Class actions are also legitimately viewed as a litigation device—
perhaps the key litigation device—allowing aggregate resolution of 
multiple claims, whether brought by plaintiffs or asserted against 
defendants. Class actions are, in fact and without question, one of 
the several devices, including joinder, intervention, and interpleader, 
among others, for bringing multiple claims together in a single 
lawsuit. Accordingly, we would expect to find the term “aggregate” 
in the class action case law as well. 
Interestingly, however, the term “aggregate” most frequently 
appears in the class action case law in the limited context of 
explaining whether a class action lawsuit satisfied the requisite 
amount in controversy. For example, the basic federal diversity 
jurisdiction statute currently requires that the matter in controversy 
exceed “the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 
costs.” 25 In the class action context, the question has been whether 
each individual class member was required independently to satisfy 
 
 24. Note, Developments in the Law: Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 877, 934 (1958) (“The historical function of a class action was to decide 
questions common to all the members of the class in one proceeding without the necessity of 
all the members appearing in court. Thus it was properly considered a representative action.” 
(footnote omitted) (citing Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 41–42 )). 
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). The grant of diversity jurisdiction appeared in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, and Congress codified diversity jurisdiction in title 28 of the United 
States Code in 1940. Act of Apr. 20, 1940, ch. 177, 54 Stat. 143 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
41(1)(b) (1946)). In 1948, Congress amended title 28 to fashion its current structure. Act of 
June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1332, 62 Stat. 869, 930 (1948). The Judiciary Act of 
1789 required the existence of more than $500 in controversy, in addition to diversity of 
citizenship, to invoke diversity jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 
11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789). Congress has repeatedly increased the amount necessary to satisfy 
the amount in controversy, from the original $500 in the Judiciary Act to $2,000 in 1887, Act 
of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, 552 (1887); to $3,000 in 1911, Act of Mar. 3, 1911, 
§ 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 (1911); to $10,000 in 1958, Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-
554, § 1332, 72 Stat. 415, 415–16 (1958); to $50,000 in 1988, The Judicial Improvements 
and Access to Justice Act, Act of Nov. 19, 1988, § 201, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 
4646 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)); to $75,000 in 1996, Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205, 110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (1996) 
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). The reason articulated for these increases to the amount in 
controversy has consistently been to reduce the number of diversity cases that may be heard in 
federal court. See S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3 (1958) (stating that the Committee on the 
Judiciary believed the increased amount in controversy would reduce the federal court 
workload); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 44–45 (1988) (stating that the increased 
amount in controversy would reduce the number of diversity cases in the federal courts and 
would adjust for inflation). 
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the jurisdictional amount, or whether the class members could 
aggregate—add together—their claims to satisfy the jurisdictional 
amount in total. The aggregation rule, which originated in 1832,26 is 
stingy, and the general rule was that aggregation was not 
permitted.27 In the specific context of class actions, the original 
version of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discussed 
in greater detail in Part III below, divided class actions into three 
types—“true” class actions, “hybrid” class actions, and “spurious” 
class actions28—and aggregation in the jurisdictional sense was 
permitted for only the “true” class action.29 When the drafters 
revised Rule 23 in 1966, a question arose as to whether class 
 
 26. See 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 3704, at 142–43 (citing Oliver v. 
Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832)). 
 27. In individual litigation, the general rule is that aggregation is not permitted, subject 
to two exceptions: (1) a single plaintiff may aggregate her own claims against a single 
defendant, and (2) aggregation is permitted when the plaintiffs are “enforc[ing] a single title or 
right in which they have a common and undivided interest.” Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 
335 (1969). 
If a single plaintiff has two entirely unrelated claims against a single defendant, and 
each of them is for $38,000, the two claims may be joined and a single suit may be 
brought in a federal court, because the aggregate of the two claims exceeds 
$75,000. If two plaintiffs each have a $38,000 claim against a single defendant, 
however, they may not aggregate their claims in a single action and may not sue in a 
federal court, no matter how similar the claims may be, so long as the claims are 
regarded as “separate and distinct.” Only if the claims are based on a common 
undivided interest may multiple plaintiffs aggregate their claims to satisfy the 
jurisdictional amount requirement. 
14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 3704, at 127–28 (citations omitted). 
 28. See Note, Developments in the Law: Class Action, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1321 
(1976) (“In 1966, the Supreme Court promulgated an amended rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, replacing a rule that had remained unchanged since 1938. The 1938 rule  
. . . reflect[ed] Professor Moore’s famous distinctions among ‘true,’ ‘hybrid,’ and ‘spurious’ 
class suits . . . .”); see also infra notes 76–83 and accompanying text (discussing the original 
Rule 23 categories). 
 29. Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D. Del. 1949). 
  It is well settled that in a “true” class action in the federal courts, whether 
jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship or upon a federal question arising 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the claims of all the members 
of the class may be aggregated for the purpose of obtaining the requisite 
jurisdictional amount. 
  On the other hand, if the action is either a “hybrid” class suit under Rule 
23(a)(2) or a “spurious” class suit under Rule 23(a)(3), then the claims of the 
several members of the class may not be aggregated to determine jurisdictional 
amount, but rather the claim of each party-plaintiff must at least equal the requisite 
jurisdictional amount specified in the statute in order for the court to have 
jurisdiction as to him. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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members could now aggregate claims as a result of the 
amendments—an assertion that the Supreme Court rejected.30 
Accordingly, from a historical perspective, aggregation was not a 
feature common to all class actions—but all class actions were 
considered representative suits. 
Of greater importance is the fact that the two terms—
“representative” and “aggregate”—convey different concepts and 
have a different emphasis. Representative generally means to act in 
the place of another; “representative” is defined as “a person or 
thing that represents another or others[;] . . . an agent.”31 
Aggregate, on the other hand, is to add together; “aggregate” is 
defined as “formed by the conjunction or collection of particulars 




 30. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 338; see also Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 292–93 
(1973), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-650, § 
310(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5113 as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 
545 U.S. 546 (2005). See generally 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 3704, at 161 
(noting that in Zahn, supra, the Supreme Court “reaffirmed the long-standing rule . . . that 
the claims of multiple parties, when separate and distinct, cannot be aggregated for 
jurisdictional amount purposes”); S. R. Shapiro, Annotation, Right, in Suit Brought as Class 
Action, To Aggregate Claims or Interests of Members of Class in Order To Satisfy Minimum 
Jurisdictional Amount Requirement in Federal District Court, 3 A.L.R. FED. 372, 380 (1970) 
(“It has been generally held or recognized that the mere fact that those purporting to sue as 
members of a class have complied with the procedural requirements governing the joinder of 
claims will not entitle them to aggregate the amounts of their claims for purposes of satisfying 
the jurisdictional amount requirement.”). Recent developments, however, have rendered many 
class action aggregation issues moot. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4(d)(6), 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (Supp. 2006) (requiring the court to aggregate “the claims of the 
individual class members . . . to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum 
or value of $5,000,000”); Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. 546 (permitting the use of 
supplemental jurisdiction in class actions to cover individual class members’ claims that do not 
satisfy the jurisdictional amount). 
 31. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1635 (2d ed. 
unabridged 1987) [hereinafter RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY]; see also THE NEW MERRIAM-
WEBSTER POCKET DICTIONARY 425 (1971) [hereinafter MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY] 
(defining “representative” as “standing or acting for another”); WEBSTER’S SEVENTH NEW 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 728 (1963) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY] (defining 
“represent” as “to act in the place of or for usu. by legal right”). See generally BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 1328 (defining “representative” as “[o]ne who stands for or 
acts on behalf of another . . . . See AGENT”). 
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defined as “taken or considered as a whole.”32 Accordingly, 
“aggregate” suggests largeness.33 
Similarly, neither term is unique to class actions. Adding claims 
together—aggregate litigation—occurs in a number of contexts, 
including traditional joinder,34 consolidation,35 interpleader,36 
intervention,37 multidistrict litigation,38 and bankruptcy.39 
Representative litigation occurs in other contexts as well, including 
an executor or administrator of an estate,40 a guardian ad litem 
 
 32. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 38; see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 10 (defining “aggregate” as “formed by the gathering of units 
into one mass”); WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 18 (defining “aggregate” as “the 
whole sum or amount: sum total”). See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 
72 (defining “aggregate” as “[f]ormed by combining into a single whole or total . . . [t]o 
collect into a whole”). 
  This notion is also found in the “aggregate theory of partnership.” See id. at 10 
(defining “aggregate theory of partnership” as “[t]he theory that a partnership does not have a 
separate legal existence (as does a corporation), but rather is only the totality of the partners 
who make it up”); see also Douglas A. Kahn & Faith Cuenin, Guaranteed Payments Made in 
Kind by a Partnership, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 405, 417 (2004) (noting the “age-old conflict of 
whether a partnership should be treated as a separate entity or merely as a representative of the 
aggregate of interests of its partners”). An “entity” approach appears in some of the class 
action literature in the context of conflict of interest concerns. See Bassett, supra note 5, at 975 
n.232 (arguing against a “class as entity” approach to conflicts of interest); Nancy J. Moore, 
Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1477, 1485–86 (proposing 
that classes should be treated as entity clients for purposes of the ethical rules). 
 33. Roget’s New Millennium Thesaurus, http://thesaurus.reference.com/search?q 
=bulk (last visited Oct. 21, 2006) (defining “bulk” as “largeness,” and listing “aggregate” as 
its synonym). 
 34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 18 (permissive joinder of claims); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 19 
(compulsory joinder of parties); FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (permissive joinder of parties). 
 35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (consolidation). 
 36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 22 (rule interpleader); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (Supp. 2006) 
(statutory interpleader). 
 37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (intervention). 
 38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000) (multidistrict litigation). 
 39. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (Supp. 2006) (setting forth the priorities of expenses and 
claims against the bankruptcy estate); see also John D. Ayer, Debt Abides: A Prolegomena for 
Any Future Chapter 11, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 427, 452 (2004) (noting that bankruptcy law is 
“a device for (a) maximizing the value of assets and (b) ‘orchestrating’ creditors’ claims”). 
 40. See HLC Props., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 105 P.3d 560, 567 (Cal. 2005) (“When 
Crosby died, his privilege transferred to his personal representative, i.e., the executor of his 
estate.”); In re Estate of Ramlose, 801 N.E.2d 76, 77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“LaSalle Bank was 
appointed as executor of the estate of Alexander Ramlose, now deceased, and appears in that 
capacity in this appeal as [Ramlose’s] representative.”); Dawson v. Ohio Dep’t of Human 
Servs., 588 N.E.2d 217, 218 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (“An executor may ordinarily prosecute in 
his representative capacity any cause which his decedent could have instituted. The executor of 
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protecting the legal interests of a minor or incapacitated person,41 
and a bankruptcy trustee.42 However, the distinction between the 
concepts of representative litigation and aggregation is striking. To 
aggregate simply involves bringing additional claims within the same 
lawsuit, while representative litigation invokes concerns beyond mere 
numbers. In class actions, adequate representation implicates both 
fiduciary obligations43 and constitutional due process,44 and thereby 
goes to the very legitimacy of the litigation—determining the 
ultimate validity of the judgment. Moreover, as Professor Mullenix 
has noted, class actions are the only type of aggregate litigation to 
require adequate representation of claimants “as a matter of due 
process.”45 
Although the traditional construction of class action reality 
permits the aggregation, or bringing together, of claims, the class 
judgment binds absent class members only when the class action 
satisfies the “representative” component. As a prerequisite to due 
process, the representative nature of the class action necessarily and 
appropriately serves as the foundation and focus of the class action 
device. Recent commentary, however, seeks to reconstruct the class 
action reality by shifting to a focus on the aggregate—a focus, in 
 
an estate, as a legal representative, settles the decedent’s affairs and ‘stands in [the decedent’s] 
shoes’ . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 41. See Sarracino v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 53, 61–62 (Cal. 1974) (“The guardian ad 
litem . . . is . . . the incompetent’s representative of record . . . .”); Keling v. Keling, 155 
S.W.3d 830, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (“[By statute,] the appointed guardian ad litem shall 
be the legal representative of the child at the hearing.”). 
 42. See Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844, 849 (1989) 
(“The bankruptcy trustee is ‘the representative of the estate [of the debtor].’” (quoting 11 
U.S.C. § 323(a) (2000))); Alvarez v. Alvarez (In re Alvarez), 224 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 
2000) (“The bankruptcy trustee is the legal representative of the bankruptcy estate . . . .”). 
 43. Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 173 n.10 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A]s class 
representatives, the moving plaintiffs have fiduciary duties towards the other members of the 
class.” (citing Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 331 (1980))); see also 
Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A 
representative [class] plaintiff acts as fiduciary for the other [members of the class].”); Becherer 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., 193 F.3d 415, 434 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting 
that “the class representative assumes a fiduciary relationship” to the class). 
 44. See infra notes 96–127 and accompanying text (discussing adequate representation 
as a prerequisite for due process). 
 45. Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law 
Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 436 (1999); see also Martin v. Wilks, 
490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that a consent decree between an employer and African-
American employees could not bind the conflicting claims of white employees who did not 
join in the consent decree). 
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essence, on the efficiency component of class actions. This recent 
trend is seen most readily by looking at a recent development in class 
action terminology. 
It has become something of a fad to use the term “aggregate 
litigation” to describe class actions46—in perhaps the most prominent 
example, the American Law Institute, best known for its 
“Restatements of the Law,” is currently undertaking a project which 
addresses class actions and is entitled “Principles of the Law of 
Aggregate Litigation.”47 The reasoning behind this trend to invoke 
the “aggregate” label is not entirely clear. One potential reason is 
mere novelty or variety—essentially seeking an occasional synonym 
to avoid overuse of the term “class action” within the particular 
writing. Another potential reason is the seeking of a systematic 
substitute (rather than an occasional synonym), specifically to avoid 
the negative connotations associated with the term “class actions.”48 
A third potential, and legitimate, reason is to employ the term 
“aggregate litigation” to discuss a broad variety of litigation devices 
for grouping claims together, and thereby encompassing such 
devices as class actions, interpleader, intervention, joinder, and 
 
 46. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1475, 1478 nn.14–15 (2005); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in 
an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 400 (2005); Elizabeth J. Goldstein, 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: A Need for Technical Innovation, 104 DICK. L. REV. 653, 
653–55, 675–76, 678 (2000); Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right To 
Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1067 (2002); Linda S. Mullenix, 
Getting to Shutts, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 727, 742 (1998); David Rosenberg, Adding a Second 
Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 52 
n.57; Shapiro, supra note 15, at 918; Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action 
Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 719 n.2 (2005). 
 47. Am. Law Inst., American Law Institute—Projects and Participants: Principles of the 
Law of Aggregate Litigation, http://www.ali.org/ali/PP5.asp (last visited Oct. 21, 2006). 
 48. Cabraser, supra note 46, at 1478 n.14. 
Given the recent resistance to expanding the application of Rule 23 itself, and the 
negative baggage that the term “class action” has accumulated, utilitarian reform 
efforts focused on providing courts and litigants with clear, fair, and useful 
procedural mechanisms for deciding common questions in ways that preclude the 
necessity of endless relitigation have adopted alternative terminology, for both real 
and symbolic reasons. For example, the American Law Institute has commenced a 
project dedicated to developing “Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation,” 
recognizing that the formal class action is not the only means by which to effectively 
organize complex litigation, and that previously underutilized mechanisms and 
principles, including collateral estoppel, voluntary joinder, and interjurisdictional 
coordination hold promise. 
Id. 
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consolidation within a single unifying term.49 A comprehensive term 
for such multiple-claim devices can be useful when seeking common 
themes among those devices but otherwise has little theoretical or 
practical utility. In a sense, the term “aggregate litigation,” as a 
general linguistic shorthand for multiple-claim devices, is not 
significantly more helpful than simply using the term “joinder” or 
“multiple claims.” Moreover, except in the specific circumstances 
where class actions are indeed being examined for their similarities to 
interpleader, intervention, and similar devices, the use of the word 
“aggregate” seems to impart more than merely a sense of “joinder” 
or “multiple claims,” but instead seems to connote “large scale.” 
Even if this trend is more style than substance, the choice 
matters. The use of “aggregate litigation” as a synonym or substitute 
for “class action” is ultimately both inaccurate and damaging, 
because in such a context the term “aggregate litigation” is 
historically inaccurate, is only partially accurate today, and is unwise 
and ultimately unfair to the class action device. 
 
 49. See Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 
26–29 (1991) (discussing class actions, consolidation, interpleader, joinder, intervention, 
multidistrict litigation, bankruptcy, and the appointment of special masters or experts as forms 
of “aggregate litigation”). In an early draft, the American Law Institute’s “Principles of the 
Law of Aggregate Litigation” included mention of class actions, permissive joinder, 
intervention, in rem actions, interpleader, and consolidation. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 4.01–.04, 6.0, at 5–8, 15–18 (Prelim. Draft No. 2, 
Apr. 20, 2005). If the project’s focus remains diffuse, this would, of course, warrant the 
broader “aggregate litigation” title. However, if the project’s genuine focus—and virtually all 
of its content—becomes class litigation, its title would then be employing “aggregate 
litigation” as a class action synonym. A more recent ALI draft greatly condensed the discussion 
of the various types of aggregate proceedings, although most of the general principles still 
apply to all types of aggregate litigation and not just to class actions. AM. LAW INST., 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02, at 6–11 (Prelim. Draft No. 4, 
Sept. 21, 2006). 
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Terminology matters.50 Our language is often ambiguous,51 and 
words convey both overt and subtle meanings.52 Words can also 
 
 50. The idea that “words matter” is found frequently in the legal literature. See, e.g., 
RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND (2004) 
(discussing dangers of hate speech); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993) 
(discussing unprotected speech); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for 
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) 
(discussing harms caused by racial insults); Gary Goodpaster, Equality and Free Speech: The 
Case Against Substantive Equality, 82 IOWA L. REV. 645, 682 (1997) (“Words matter and 
have consequences . . . .”); Douglas Laycock, Constitutional Theory Matters, 65 TEX. L. REV. 
767, 774 (1987) (“[W]ords . . . do not communicate perfectly, but words are all we have. 
Practical people know that those words matter.”); Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501, 508 (2005) (“[I]n the practice of law, words matter 
enormously.”); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 327 
(1995) (“It is undeniable that a good deal of speech—and not just pornography or hate 
speech—does matter; it may construct reality, create stereotypes, or affect attitudes and 
behavior.”). 
 51. Derek Auchie, The Undignified Death of the Casus Omissus Rule, 25 STATUTE L. 
REV. 40, 51 (2004) (“The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision.” 
(quoting Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 K.B. 481, 489–99 (C.A.))); Robert A. 
Green, Justice Blackmun’s Federal Tax Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109, 139 
(1998) (“The limits of the English language ensure ambiguity . . . .”); Terri LeClercq, 
Doctrine of the Last Antecedent: The Mystifying Morass of Ambiguous Modifiers, 40 TEX. J. BUS. 
L. 199, 202–04 (2004) (noting the “inherent ambiguities in the English language”); 
Symposium, A Matter of Life and Death: New Jersey’s Death Penalty Statute in the 21st Century, 
23 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 249, 298 (1999) (noting that “we have inadequacies in language” 
and that “there are inherent ambiguities in the English language”). 
 52. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 386 (1948) (“Words generally have 
different shades of meaning . . . .” (quoting Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 258 
(1937))); LeClercq, supra note 51, at 201 (noting “how difficult it can be to achieve clarity 
using the multifaceted English language”); Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, 
Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 139–40 (1998) (“Some 
words lacerate more than others; some words hide more than others. Even when words carry 
hidden meanings, they can profoundly influence how we think. Language plays an important 
role in reality control.”); see also Samuel P. Hays, Forest Values, New and Old: Comments on 
David Clary’s Timber and the Forest Service, 17 ENVTL. L. 707, 716 (1987) (noting “the 
more subtle meaning of language”). 
For example, in the 1950s the words “multiple use” referred to those new uses of 
recreation, fish, wildlife, and wilderness in contrast to the earlier dominant 
commodity uses. In the ensuing years, however, the heavy focus on the wilderness 
debate reversed the meaning as commodity users, bolstered now by motorized 
recreationists, took up the banner of multiple use in the face of their single-use 
wilderness opponents. Now, however, the pendulum is swinging back to the 1950s 
as the many new types of users identify timber and its associated road building as 
their “single-use” enemy under the banner of multiple-use. 
  On an even more subtle level, changes in the real world of debate are giving 
rise to new meanings not recognized by old terms. 
Id. 
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create “spin”—meaning “[t]o provide an interpretation of (a 
statement or event, for example), especially in a way meant to sway 
public opinion.”53 The words we select can emphasize certain aspects 
or attributes54 and can downplay others.55 Accordingly, and 
particularly in the already politicized area of class actions,56 
terminology deserves attention.57 
Since class actions are a form of aggregate litigation, there is 
nothing inherently illegitimate about the “aggregate litigation” label. 
In fact, as previously noted, the use of the term “aggregate 
litigation” potentially removes the pejorative associations connected 
to the term “class action,” and thus may serve to keep the reader’s 
mind more open to the ensuing discussion. However, there are 
deeper substantive meanings that accompany this terminology. The 
term “aggregate litigation” carries a particular “spin” that differs 
 
 53. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 
2000), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=spin. 
Both political parties take advantage of the ability of language to influence opinion 
. . . . To offset the ire of some environmentalists, Frank Luntz, a Republican 
strategist, has called for “softer, greener language” about the environment—the 
Republicans’ most vulnerable issue. So he urged Republicans to use the term climate 
change instead of global warming. They no longer refer to environmental issues; 
they are now conservationist issues. A Sierra Club consultant acknowledged that the 
new language has succeeded in blunting the Democratic attack. 
Gertrude Block, Language for Lawyers, FED. LAW., Jun. 2003, at 45. 
 54. See Ethan Bronner, Poll Shows Shift Toward Support of Abortion Rights, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 17, 1989, at 1 (reporting on differences in poll results depending on how the 
pollsters phrased the questions, and noting this “indicate[s] why supporters of abortion rights 
emphasize so strongly the word ‘choice’ in their campaigns and slogans”); Paul Gewirtz & 
Chad Golder, So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at A19 (When “Democrats 
or Republicans seek to criticize judges or judicial nominees, they often resort to the same 
language. They say that the judge is ‘activist.’”). 
 55. See J.A. BARNES, A PACK OF LIES: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LYING 115 (1994) 
(“[A] war may seem less sour if it is called an ‘international armed conflict,’ the Pentagon term 
for the carnage in Vietnam. . . . Terms such as these anesthetize us more selectively than the 
simple use of traditional metaphors.”). 
 56. See Del Jones, Allstate CEO: Firms Should Be Politically Active, USA TODAY, Jul. 18, 
2005, at 3B (“President Bush signed a bill in February that will send most class-action lawsuits 
into federal courts. It was regarded as a major victory for business, as was the bankruptcy bill 
that starting in October will make it more difficult for consumers to avoid paying debt. . . . A 
key man behind the law is Edward Liddy, CEO of Allstate, who chairs the Business 
Roundtable’s Civil Justice Reform Task Force. Liddy isn’t finished. Asbestos and medical 
liability are next on his wish list.”). 
 57. Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, Colloquy, The Flesh-Colored Band Aid—
Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue, and Norms, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 791, 811 (1991) (“[E]very 
litigator or drafter of legal documents knows the power and importance of each chosen word. 
Language is a mechanism of power.” (citation omitted)). 
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from that associated with representative litigation. Using “aggregate 
litigation” to describe class actions emphasizes numbers or size. This 
focus on numbers renders a sense of “aggregate litigation” as 
intimidating and overwhelming, perhaps suggesting unwieldiness—a 
view consistent with the discredited idea of a litigation explosion. 
The natural response is to try to make the claims go away—by 
concentrating on reducing court dockets, attaining global 
settlements, and preventing subsequent challenges so as to preserve 
those settlements. These goals often are framed in terms of 
“efficiency” and “economy”—meaning to dispose of many claims in 
a single proceeding.58 Although efficiency and economy certainly are 
among the goals of class litigation,59 the term “aggregate litigation,” 
when used as a synonym for “class action,” has the effect, whether 
intended or not, of emphasizing these convenience factors—thus 
detracting from, and undervaluing, the more distinctive and 
constitutionally-mandated goal of adequate representation. 
The class action feature that is both most distinctive and most 
compelling for the preservation of the class action device is not the 
ability to aggregate claims—it is the class action’s representative 
nature. Adding claims together is neither a difficult concept nor 
difficult to achieve;60 attaining genuinely adequate representation for 
all claimants is both. And while adding claims together is convenient, 
it is merely one advantage of the class action device.61 Unlike the 
aggregate feature of class actions—meaning that a class action folds 
numerous claims into a single lawsuit—the representative nature of 
class actions is both central to the class action concept and rises to a 
constitutional dimension. Adequate representation is a due process 
 
 58. Victor E. Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Law of Unintended Consequences in 
Asbestos Litigation: How Efforts To Streamline the Litigation Have Fueled More Claims, 71 
MISS. L.J. 531, 542 (2001) (“In the mid-1980s judges began to allow cases to be consolidated 
because it promoted efficiency and allowed judges to dispose of many cases at once.”). 
 59. See 1 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 14, § 3:3, at 220 (noting that judicial 
economy is one of the objectives of the class action device). 
 60. William Gaus, State and Federal Employment Class Actions and Other Representative 
Actions, in 31ST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 205, 217 (2002) (“Satisfaction 
of the numerosity requirement is rarely an issue.”). 
 61. 1 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 14, § 1:1, at 3 (“One major advantage of class 
actions to the courts, attorneys, and litigants is the judicial economy and efficiency they can 
achieve.”). 
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prerequisite.62 Thus, “aggregate litigation” is a poor class action 
synonym because its overinclusiveness63 necessarily downplays and 
minimizes the distinctive representative nature of class actions. 
The primary significance of this linguistic development is that it 
reflects an underlying conceptual movement. The use of “aggregate 
litigation” as a synonym or substitute for “class action” reflects an 
underlying movement in the legal literature to construct a new class 
action reality—a movement that, in the name of efficiency, would 
inherently and necessarily compromise existing due process 
protections for absent class members. A fuller understanding of the 
potential impact of this movement requires a fuller understanding of 
class action reality as originally constructed and, in particular, the 
significance of its “representative” and “aggregate” components. 
The original construction of class action reality can be found in the 
historical background of, and the Supreme Court jurisprudence 
pertaining to, the class action device. Accordingly, these are the 
subjects of the next two Parts. 
III. A BRIEF BACKGROUND OF CLASS ACTIONS 
Historically, class actions have embraced both a “representative” 
component and an “aggregate” component. Although laypersons 
often believe class actions to be a recent development, group 
litigation extends back for centuries.64 Indeed, Professor Yeazell has 
traced the earliest published sources of group litigation to the year 
1199.65 Class actions are a procedural device developed in  
 
 62. Id. § 1:7, at 28 (“When adequate representation is present, then the essential 
adjudicatory characteristic of representative litigation can be realized, to wit, the adjudication 
of common questions, whether favorable or not, will be binding on class members.”). 
 63. Some class actions, such as those authorized by Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), may 
involve large numbers but are unlike traditional “aggregate” litigation—for example, they seek 
law reform or are part of a constitutional challenge. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 
(1987) (Rule 23 class action involving constitutional claims of prisoners); Alsina-Ortiz v. 
LaBoy, 400 F.3d 77, 80 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005) (discussing consent decree resulting from class 
action that was “designed to reform conditions and health care in the Puerto Rico prison 
system”). 
 64. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes in 
Collective Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 687, 687–88 (1997); see also 1 CONTE & NEWBERG, 
supra note 14, § 3:3, at 219 (“Class actions trace their beginning to the English common law 
of equity.” (citation omitted)). 
 65. Yeazell, supra note 64, at 688. Professor Yeazell describes this early case 
entertainingly: 
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equity,66 in which the named plaintiffs act as representatives for 
themselves and for a class of similarly-situated others in pursuing a 
remedy.67 The historical purpose “of a class action was to decide 
questions common to all the members of the class in one proceeding 
without the necessity of all the members appearing in court.”68 Thus, 
the historical conception of the class action was not merely the 
creation of an “aggregation” device to dispose of multitudinous 
claims, but also a true “representative” device to facilitate bringing 
multiple claims to the court. 
 
On the eve of the thirteenth century, Martin, the rector of a parish, brought suit 
against four of his parishioners—as representatives of the rest—asserting his right to 
certain parochial fees. I am sad to say that Father Martin was in part insisting that his 
parishioners carry the bodies of their dead several miles to a place where he could 
bury them for a customary fee; alternatively, he was benevolently prepared to let 
them bury their deceased in a nearby chapel graveyard—so long as they remitted to 
Martin the same customary burial fee as he would have earned had he conducted the 
service himself. Not an edifying or happy tale. 
Id. Professor Yeazell has extensively researched the historical background of class actions. See 
generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN 
CLASS ACTION (1987) (tracing the history of the class action); Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group 
Litigation to Class Action, 27 UCLA L. REV. 514, 523–35 (1980) (noting the emergence of 
new group litigants after the industrialization of nineteenth-century England); Stephen C. 
Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. 
L. REV. 866, 876 (1977) (discussing seventeenth-century British antecedents to the class 
action device). 
 66. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948) (“The 
class action was an invention of equity, mothered by the practical necessity of providing a 
procedural device so that mere numbers would not disable large groups of individuals, united 
in interest, from enforcing their equitable rights nor grant them immunity from their equitable 
wrongs.” (citation omitted)). See generally Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple 
Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1297, 1297 (1932) (discussing the bill of peace in equity); Note, 
supra note 24, at 928 (discussing devices enabling classes of individuals to sue or be sued). 
 67. Oswald v. Gen. Motors Corp. (In re Gen. Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig.), 
594 F.2d 1106, 1127 n.33 (7th Cir. 1979) (describing class action device as primarily 
vindicating rights of individual class members and also as vehicle for furthering substantive 
policies behind legislation); Welmaker v. W.T. Grant Co., 365 F. Supp. 531, 553 (N.D. Ga. 
1972) (“The traditional purpose of a class action is to generate incentive to litigate claims that 
would otherwise not be litigated because they are so small as to make it impractical to bring 
individual suits.”). 
 68. See Note, supra note 24, at 934 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41–42 
(1940)). 
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From 1833 until 1912, Equity Rule 4869 governed representative 
litigation in the federal courts.70 The Equity Rules were revised in 
1912, and Equity Rule 48 was repealed. However, the basic 
representative litigation device remained, and was incorporated in 
Equity Rule 38. This rule, which is “probably the most 
straightforward of all the rules adopted to date to provide for class or 
representative actions,”71 provided that “[w]hen the question is one 
of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class 
so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the 
court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.”72 Thus, Equity 
Rule 38 contained both the “representative” and the “aggregate” 
components that we continue to associate with class actions. 
The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of course, created a 
single form of civil action, merging together law and equity.73 
Original Rule 23, which was incorporated in the 1938 Rules and 
addressed class actions,74 was “primarily an attempt to codify, not to 
 
 69. See FED. R. EQ. 48 (1842) (repealed 1912), quoted in 42 U.S. (1 How.) lvi (1843). 
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest 
inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the court in 
its discretion may dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the 
suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all the adverse interests of the 
plaintiffs and defendants in the suit properly before it. But in such cases the decree 
shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties. 
Id. 
 70. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. OF CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION 
DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 10–11 (2000). 
In 1833, the first provision for group litigation in federal courts was set forth as 
Equity Rule 48. This rule allowed for a representative suit when the parties on either 
side were too numerous for convenient administration of the suit; unlike the Bill of 
Peace, however, at first the outcomes of such group litigation were not binding on 
similarly situated absent parties. Ten years later, in a case arising out of the pre-Civil 
War tensions between North and South, the U.S. Supreme Court held that absent 
parties could be bound by the outcomes of cases brought under Equity Rule 48. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 71. Id. at 11. 
 72. John G. Harkins, Jr., Federal Rule 23—The Early Years, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 705, 705 
(1997) (citing JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 231 (1930)). 
 73. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in the United States district 
courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity . . . .”); FED. 
R. CIV. P. 2 (“There shall be one form of action to be known as ‘civil action.’”). 
 74. The original Rule 23 provided, in pertinent part: 
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it 
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will 
fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued 
when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is 
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reform.”75 The class action categories reflected in original Rule 23 by 
subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) were called “true,” “hybrid,” 
and “spurious” class actions, respectively.76 In addition to the 
differences in description,77 the three types differed both with respect 
 
  (1) joint or common, or secondary in the sense that an owner of a primary 
right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes 
entitled to enforce it; 
  (2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do 
or may affect specific property involved in the action; or 
  (3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several 
rights and a common relief is sought. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (1938), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 94–95 (1966). 
 75. Harkins, supra note 72, at 705–06. 
The drafters understood that the rules which they would propose should be rules of 
procedure only, not rules which would cause changes in substantive rights. In the 
context of class actions, where the rights of those not before the court might be 
affected, this principle had obvious importance. The result was said to be an attempt 
to categorize the types of cases which might proceed as class actions, based on the 
existing practice. 
Id. at 705 (footnotes omitted). 
 76. See id. at 706–07 (“A categorization of acceptable classes—described in terms of the 
character of the interests to be litigated—occurs in the three numbered paragraphs of 
subdivision (a). . . . The three classes were described by Professor Moore as, respectively, a 
‘true’ class, a ‘hybrid’ class and a ‘spurious’ class.”); see also Note, supra note 28, at 1321 
(“The 1938 rule, which was understood to reflect Professor Moore’s famous distinctions 
among ‘true,’ ‘hybrid,’ and ‘spurious’ class suits, proved to be a source of confusion almost 
from its date of promulgation . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
  In a “true” or (a)(1) class, the rights sought to be enforced were shared 
rights—the “jural relationship”—and joinder of all members of the class would be 
required to adjudicate those rights. The (a)(1) class action was thus a substitute for 
mandatory joinder where the members of the class were so numerous as to make 
such joinder impracticable. In the case of the “hybrid” or (a)(2) class, while the 
rights of the class members might be several and not joint, those rights would relate 
to some specific property, often a fund, over which the court would assume what 
would be (or at least would be akin to) in rem jurisdiction. The jural relationship 
would arise from the fact that the members of the class had “several” (rather than 
joint) interests involving some distinct property and the interests of all of them with 
respect to that property might be affected by the outcome of the litigation. 
  In the “spurious” class under (a)(3), if there was any “jural relationship,” it was 
a fiction created to justify bringing together those who had no prior relationship 
whatsoever. What would join the members of an (a)(3) class together was the 
happenstance (and not a relationship) that determination of their “several” rights 
would depend at least in part on resolution of a common question of law or fact, 
and then only if it were further supposed that the members would seek common 
relief. In this case, allowing the action to proceed as a class action would serve 
(imperfectly) as a kind of permissive joinder mechanism by which strangers might 
come together to litigate. 
Harkins, supra note 72, at 707 (footnotes omitted). 
 77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee note (1966 Amend.). 
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to the parties’ ability to aggregate claims to satisfy the minimum 
jurisdictional amount and with respect to the preclusive effect78 of 
the judgment.79 Only “true” class actions—not “hybrid” or 
 
It was thought that the definitions [in original Rule 23] accurately described the 
situations amenable to the class-suit device, and also would indicate the proper 
extent of the judgment in each category, which would in turn help to determine the 
res judicata effect of the judgment if questioned in a later action. Thus the 
judgments in “true” and “hybrid” class actions would extend to the class (although 
in somewhat different ways); the judgment in a “spurious” class action would 
extend only to the parties including intervenors. 
Id.; Note, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 202, 207 n.30 (1969) 
(“[B]ecause the categories of maintainable class actions in the old [Rule 23] were based on 
whether the interests involved were ‘joint’ or ‘several,’ placement in a category also happened 
to determine whether the claims could be aggregated. Aggregation was allowed in ‘true’ class 
actions, but not in ‘hybrid’ or ‘spurious’ ones.”). 
 78. The class judgment in “spurious” class actions did not bind absent class members. 
See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (discussing claim aggregation and preclusive 
effect of “true,” “hybrid,” and “spurious” class actions under original Rule 23). However, the 
“spurious” class action’s lack of preclusive effect did not eliminate the necessity of adequate 
representation. See Carroll v. Associated Musicians of Greater N.Y., 206 F. Supp. 462, 465, 
470 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (describing the spurious class action as merely “a congeries of separate 
suits,” but declining to find that the plaintiffs would “fairly insure adequate representation of 
such class”); Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 681, 689 (S.D. Tex. 1959) (noting that “[s]ince 
a spurious class action is a form of permissive joinder device and binds only the original parties 
and intervenors, the court does not need to make a searching inquiry into the adequacy of the 
representation of the class,” but nevertheless concluding that because two plaintiffs’ interests 
seemed antagonistic to the interests of other plaintiffs, adequate representation did not exist 
and a spurious class action could not be maintained); Canuel v. Oskoian, 23 F.R.D. 307, 311 
(D.R.I. 1959) (“Since the rights of non-appearing members of the plaintiff class cannot be 
adjudicated herein, I am of the opinion that the named plaintiffs adequately represent the 
plaintiff class and can be expected to prosecute vigorously the claims asserted in the 
complaint.”). 
 79. The preclusive effect of class actions had been problematic even before the 
promulgation of original Rule 23. See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1751, at 15 
(“Although the English practice was to treat a class-action judgment as binding on everyone in 
the group, there was considerable uncertainty in the United States as to the res-judicata effect 
on nonparty class members.”); id. at 16 (noting that Federal Equity Rule 48 seemed, by its 
terms, to prohibit any preclusive effect, but “[n]onetheless, since one of the principal purposes 
of allowing class suits was to prevent the multiplicity of actions involving common questions 
and to obtain a final determination of the issues raised, this sentence occasionally was ignored 
and the judgment was declared binding on all members of the group” (footnote omitted)); 
Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class 
Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1163 (1998) (“[C]onsiderable uncertainty existed in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries over the preclusive effect of class actions. Sometimes 
they were allowed to have such effect; sometimes they were not.” (footnote omitted)). This 
uncertainty continued after original Rule 23 took effect. Id. (“This disarray continued even 
after the codes took over the equity practice.”); see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical 
Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1937 (1998) (“The 
tripartite classification scheme adopted in [original] Rule 23 was based on Moore’s position 
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“spurious” class actions—permitted the aggregation of claims to 
meet the jurisdictional amount;80 absentees were bound by a class 
judgment in “true” and “hybrid” class actions, but not in “spurious” 
ones.81 
Courts found the “true,” “hybrid,” and “spurious” categories 
confusing,82 resulting in amendments to Rule 23 in 1966. The 1966 
revisions to Rule 23 abandoned the previous labels, and instead 
described the types of class actions in practical terms.83 
 
that differences in the ‘jural relationships’ among class members required different treatment 
and entailed different consequences so far as res judicata is concerned.” (footnote omitted)); 
id. at 1938–39 (“Although [original] Rule 23 did not discuss res judicata, Moore argued that 
the binding effect of a class suit should depend on the category into which a suit was 
subsumed. With ‘true’ and ‘hybrid’ class suits, he stated that absentee class members were 
bound. . . . Both of these categories consisted of cases that, but for the class suit device, would 
require joinder of absentees as necessary parties. With ‘spurious’ class suits, absentees were not 
bound . . . . Most federal courts adopted Moore’s statements on res judicata . . . .” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 80. See Shapiro, supra note 30, at 377 (“In a true class action, in which the members of 
the class unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common or undivided 
interest, aggregation of their claims or interests is permissible for purposes of satisfying the 
jurisdictional amount requirement, but in a suit which is merely a spurious or hybrid class 
action, in which each class member’s claim or interest is separate and distinct from those 
asserted by the others, such aggregation is not permissible.”). 
 81. See Note, supra note 77, at 207–08 (“Placement in a category [under original Rule 
23] . . . determined the scope of the binding effect of the judgment.”); id. at 208 n.31 (“In 
‘true’ class actions under old rule 23, all class members were bound by the judgment. In 
‘hybrid’ actions, named parties were bound, and with respect to the property, the remaining 
class members were also bound. In ‘spurious’ actions only the parties were bound.”). 
 82. See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1939), rev’d, 
108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939), rev’d, 311 U.S. 282 (1940), remanded to 39 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. 
Pa. 1941), rev’d sub nom. Pa. Co. for Ins. on Lives v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941) 
(reflecting confusion as to which of the class action categories should apply); 39 F.R.D. 98 
advisory committee’s note (1966) (describing the “true,” “hybrid,” and “spurious” 
classifications as “obscure and uncertain,” and stating that “[t]he courts had considerable 
difficulty with these terms”); see also Yeazell, supra note 64, at 696 n.41 (describing original 
Rule 23’s categories as “a taxonomy that few professed to understand, and by which courts 
confessed themselves baffled”); Note, supra note 28, at 1321 (noting that original Rule 23’s 
categories “proved to be a source of confusion almost from its date of promulgation”). 
 83. Revised Rule 23 provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact 
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the 
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
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Issues related to aggregation and preclusion84 in class actions 
have remained, although those issues differ in nature from those 
under original Rule 23. With respect to aggregation, the Supreme 
Court held that class members could not aggregate their claims to 
satisfy the jurisdictional amount.85 However, two recent 
developments likely will diminish the need for aggregation in most 
federal class action lawsuits—the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 
which expressly authorizes aggregation when the amount in 
controversy would thereby exceed $5 million,86 and the Supreme 
Court’s 2005 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. decision, 
which authorizes the use of supplemental jurisdiction in class 
actions.87 With respect to preclusion, the 1966 revisions clarified the 
 
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the 
class would create a risk of  
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual 
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of 
conduct for the party opposing the class, or  
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which 
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other 
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or 
impede their ability to protect their interests; or 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members 
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, 
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings 
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any 
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against 
members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be 
encountered in the management of a class action. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b). 
 84. See Hazard et al., supra note 79, at 1849 (noting that precedent on the issue of 
preclusion in class actions historically has been “equivocal and confused, and . . . remains 
somewhat so today”). 
 85. Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 
(1969). 
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (requiring the court to aggregate the claims of the 
individual class members to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or 
value of $5,000,000). 
 87. 545 U.S. 546, 546 (2005) (“[W]here the other elements of jurisdiction are present 
and at least one named plaintiff in the action satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement, 
§ 1367 does authorize supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs in the same 
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drafters’ intention that all class judgments have preclusive effect.88 
Some limited preclusion issues have remained, however, most 
notably regarding subsequent collateral attacks against class 
judgments.89 
Thus, from a historical perspective, class actions are more than 
purely aggregate lawsuits. As explored in the next Part, the defining 
characteristic of the class action—the feature most distinctive and 
most compelling—is its representative nature. For this reason, to 
shift to a focus on the aggregate deemphasizes, blurs, and softens the 
critical central nature of the class action reality. 
IV. “REPRESENTATIVE” VERSUS “AGGREGATE”: TERMINOLOGY IN 
THE SUPREME COURT’S CLASS ACTION CASE LAW 
In addition to the references to “representative” actions within 
Rule 23 itself, the United States Supreme Court has regularly and 
repeatedly invoked the “representative” nature of the device in 
discussing class actions.90 In contrast, the phrase “aggregate 
 
Article III case or controversy, even if those claims are for less than the jurisdictional amount 
specified in the statute setting forth the requirements for diversity jurisdiction.”). 
 88. See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive 
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1261–62 (2002) (“[C]lass actions under the 1966 revision were 
all meant to have full res judicata effect. The 1966 Rule drafters made perfectly clear—and for 
the first time—that the entire point of the class action procedure was to adjudicate individual 
claims in one proceeding with full binding effect on each and every class member.”). 
 89. See Bassett, supra note 5, at 936–37 (“As a representative action, a class action thus 
serves to bind every class member, including similarly situated individuals who did not actually 
participate in the class action lawsuit. However, unless those who actually participated in the 
lawsuit were adequate representatives of all of the diverse interests within the purported class, 
the class action judgment cannot be used to preclude a subsequent action involving the 
inadequately represented interests.”); William V. Luneburg, The Opportunity To Be Heard and 
the Doctrines of Preclusion: Federal Limits on State Law, 31 VILL. L. REV. 81, 114 (1986) 
(“The constitutional mandate of an opportunity to be heard requires . . . disregard of the 
preclusive effect of the judgment” when an absent class member has been inadequately 
represented); Monaghan, supra note 79, at 1200 (“[N]on-party, nonresident class members 
should remain free to challenge an otherwise preclusive class judgment on due process grounds 
in a forum of their choosing.”); Wolff, supra note 46, at 803 (“It remains a matter of serious 
dispute whether [a subsequent] court may recognize a full-scale collateral attack and set aside a 
class judgment on adequacy grounds.”); Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack 
for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383, 445 (2000) (“The 
understanding that absent class members may collaterally attack a judgment based on 
inadequate representation is deeply entrenched in the law.”). 
 90. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 306 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832, 834, 841, 846 (1999); Amchem 
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 
797, 808 (1985); American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 549–50 (1974); 
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litigation,” as such, does not appear in any of the Court’s decisions.91 
The aggregate nature of class actions—the bringing together of 
numerous parties in one lawsuit for judicial economy—is certainly an 
integral part of class actions as well as other multiple-claim devices. 
Although the word “aggregate” (or “aggregation”) does appear in 
some of the Court’s class action opinions, the Supreme Court has 
not used “aggregate” as a class action descriptor.92 Instead, the 
Supreme Court’s class action decisions referring to “aggregate” (or 
“aggregation”) discuss either a sum total, such as the “aggregate 
damages” involved,93 or the concept of aggregating claims for the 
purpose of satisfying the minimum jurisdictional amount.94 This is 
not to suggest that the Supreme Court neither notices nor cares 
when a case involves numerous parties. My point, as explored below, 
is that the Court has declined to emphasize the aggregate over the 
representative in class actions, despite opportunities to do so. 
In sharp contrast to the aggregate feature of class actions—
meaning that a class action folds numerous claims into a single 
 
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940); Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72–73 (1939); 
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921). 
 91. A search conducted on Westlaw using the Supreme Court (“SCT”) database and the 
search term “aggregate litigation” yielded no cases. Searches of the federal district and circuit 
court decisions fared little better. In the federal circuit court database (“CTA”), the search 
term “aggregate litigation” yielded five cases, three of which are the same quote from In re 
Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation, 971 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1992). This quote appears in 
this Article at note 196, infra. In the federal district court database (“DCT”), the search term 
“aggregate litigation” yielded eight cases, five of which again involve this same quote. Of the 
five cases remaining, one cites a law review article that has the term “aggregate litigation” in its 
title, and the other four discuss a sum total, such as “aggregate litigation expenses.” 
 92. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 93. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 526 (1967). The 
leading class action treatise similarly refers to “aggregate” in this sense: 
After proof of the defendant’s liability to the class, the issue remains concerning a 
determination of what damages or other relief class members are entitled to receive. 
When a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief are sought, the class 
representative traditionally will obtain this relief in the aggregate for the entire class 
or, when appropriate, for particular subclasses that compose or are part of the entire 
class. . . . There are occasions when it is feasible and reasonable to prove aggregate 
monetary relief for the class . . . . 
3 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 14, § 10:1, at 476; see also id. § 10:2, at 477 (“[T]he 
ultimate goal in class actions is to determine the aggregate sum, which fairly represents the 
collective value of claims of individual class members.”). 
 94. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 571 (2005) 
(discussing the Class Action Fairness Act); Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 292, 295–
301 (1973), overruled on other grounds by Exxon Mobile Corp., 545 U.S. at 566; Snyder v. 
Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 334–35 (1969); Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 88 (1939). 
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lawsuit—the representative nature of class actions is both central to 
the class action concept and rises to a constitutional dimension. As 
the Supreme Court has noted, “selection of representatives for 
purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily 
or even probably the same as those whom they are deemed to 
represent, does not afford that protection to absent parties which 
due process requires.”95 
Again and again, the Supreme Court has emphasized adequate 
representation as a due process prerequisite to a binding class 
judgment. The classic adequate representation case is the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hansberry v. Lee, in which the Supreme Court 
specifically equated adequacy of representation with due process, and 
which allowed class actions only when adequate representation 
existed.96 Hansberry considered Illinois state court practices.97 An 
earlier Illinois case, Burke v. Kleiman, had successfully enforced a 
racially restrictive covenant.98 Subsequently, Anna Lee and others 
sought to enforce the same covenant against Carl Hansberry, an 
African-American.99 Hansberry defended against Lee’s action by 
arguing that the covenant never became effective because its terms 
required, as a prerequisite, the signatures of ninety-five percent of 
the landowners within the designated area and that the requisite 
number of signatures had never been obtained.100 Lee pleaded that 
this issue was precluded by the Burke judgment; Hansberry 
countered that application of the preclusion doctrine against him 
would violate due process.101 
The Supreme Court, characterizing Burke as a class action, noted 
that absent actually participating in an action or standing in privity 
with one actually participating in an action, “members of a class . . . 
may [only] be bound by the judgment where they are in fact 
adequately represented by parties who are present . . . .”102 The 
 
 95. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45. 
 96. Id.; see Bassett, supra note 5, at 938 (“Hansberry was notable for equating adequacy 
of representation with due process, thereby establishing adequacy as a prerequisite to a binding 
class judgment.”). 
 97. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 36. 
 98. 277 Ill. App. 519, 520, 533–34 (1934). 
 99. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 37–38. 
 100. Id. at 38. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 42–43. 
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Court found that the purported class in Burke consisted of “dual and 
potentially conflicting interests.”103 Due to these conflicts, adequate 
representation did not exist, and thus the prior Burke action could 
not bind Hansberry.104 To the Court, the representation issue 
predominated over the aggregate aspects of the class action.105 
Hansberry was pivotal in the history of class actions and was notable 
for equating adequacy of representation with due process, thereby 
establishing representativeness as a prerequisite to a binding class 
judgment. 
Since Hansberry v. Lee, the two most important class action 
decisions to meaningfully address adequacy of representation106 are 
the Court’s relatively recent opinions in Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor107 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.108 In Amchem and Ortiz, 
the Court again emphasized the importance of adequate 
representation in class actions generally. In both cases, the Court 
then went a step further by declining the opportunity to subordinate 
adequate representation to the desirability of a class-wide settlement, 
and thereby further established the preeminence of representation 
over aggregation. 
 
 103. Id. at 44. 
[A]ll those alleged to be bound by the [covenant] would not constitute a single class 
in any litigation brought to enforce it. Those who sought to secure its benefits by 
enforcing it could not be said to be in the same class with or represent those whose 
interest was in resisting performance . . . . 
Id. 
 104. Id. at 45–46. 
 105. See id. at 41–42, 44–46. 
 106. Other Supreme Court decisions have mentioned adequacy of representation, but 
without much elaboration. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 379 
n.5 (1996) (noting that one of the briefs raised an adequacy of representation issue, but stating 
that the issue was “outside the scope of the question presented in this Court”); Id. at 396, 399 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasizing “the centrality of the procedural due 
process protection of adequate representation in class-action lawsuits, emphatically including 
those resolved by settlement,” and noting that “[f]inal judgments . . . remain vulnerable to 
collateral attack for failure to satisfy the adequate representation requirement”); Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (reiterating the necessity of adequate 
representation to due process and stating that “the Due Process Clause of course requires that 
the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class 
members”); Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156, 161 (1982) (noting the Court had 
“repeatedly held that ‘a class representative must be part of the class and “possess the same 
interest and suffer the same injury” as the class members,’” and noting the necessity of “a 
rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied”). 
 107. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 108. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
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Amchem and Ortiz squarely, strikingly, and compellingly 
presented the competing notions of representation and aggregation. 
Both Amchem and Ortiz were asbestos class actions,109 described in 
Ortiz as part of the “elephantine mass of asbestos cases,”110 and both 
involved issues of adequate representation in a class-wide 
settlement.111 If the Court had been inclined to do so, the claims in 
Amchem and Ortiz presented the best possible circumstances for the 
Court to shift its emphasis from a “representative” to an “aggregate” 
focus. 
Indeed, the dissents in both Amchem and Ortiz focused on the 
“aggregate” nature of the asbestos litigation involved.112 Justice 
Breyer’s separate opinion in Amchem, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, bluntly stated, “I believe that the need for 
settlement in this mass tort case, with hundreds of thousands of 
lawsuits, is greater than the Court’s opinion suggests.”113 Justice 
Breyer again dissented in Ortiz, and again focused on the enormous 
number of asbestos cases.114 The first sentence of his Ortiz dissent 
noted that “[the] case involve[d] a settlement of an estimated 
186,000 potential future asbestos claims against a single 
company.”115 His dissent goes on to note that “[i]n the past decade 
 
 109. Id.; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597. 
 110. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821; see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598 (quoting Report of the 
Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation 2-3 (Mar. 1991)), which states: 
[This] is a tale of danger known in the 1930s, exposure inflicted upon millions of 
Americans in the 1940s and 1950s, injuries that began to take their toll in the 
1960s, and a flood of lawsuits beginning in the 1970s. On the basis of past and 
current filing data, and because of a latency period that may last as long as 40 years 
for some asbestos related diseases, a continuing stream of claims can be expected. 
The final toll of asbestos related injuries is unknown. Predictions have been made of 
200,000 asbestos disease deaths before the year 2000 and as many as 265,000 by 
the year 2015. 
  The most objectionable aspects of asbestos litigation can be briefly 
summarized: dockets in both federal and state courts continue to grow; long delays 
are routine; trials are too long; the same issues are litigated over and over; 
transaction costs exceed the victims’ recovery by nearly two to one; exhaustion of 
assets threatens and distorts the process; and future claimants may lose altogether. 
Id. 
 111. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 830–31; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613. 
 112. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting); Ortiz, 527 U.S. 
at 866–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 113. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 114. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 866–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. at 865. 
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nearly 80,000 new federal asbestos cases have been filed; more than 
10,000 new federal asbestos cases were filed last year,”116 and that 
“asbestos cases on average take almost twice as long as other lawsuits 
to resolve.”117 Clearly, “aggregate” concerns were squarely before 
the Court. 
The extraordinary number of potential asbestos claims, and the 
ongoing nature of asbestos litigation, framed issues of the 
“aggregate” persuasively. In both Amchem and Ortiz, a class 
settlement hung in the balance—settlements which, if upheld, would 
have disposed of thousands upon thousands of claims and which, if 
undone, would have put those same thousands upon thousands of 
claims back into the courts. The opportunity to reconstruct class 
action reality with a focus on the aggregate was clearly and 
compellingly presented. Yet the Court rejected both settlements—
and an aggregate focus—and came down decisively and 
unequivocally in favor of a representative emphasis. 
Amchem was a settlement class action—it was filed as such and 
certified as such, with no intention to litigate the matter.118 The 
Amchem settlement purported to encompass both present and future 
claimants, but the Court stated that the diversity of interests within 
the class required the use of subclasses.119 Finding that the proposed 
class lacked adequacy of representation, the Court observed that the 
so-called “global compromise” did not fairly represent the various 
interests within the class.120 
Similarly, in Ortiz, the Supreme Court insisted on the primacy of 
the adequacy of representation inquiry121 and expressly rejected the 
perceived overall fairness of the settlement’s terms as a substitute for 
 
 116. Id. at 866. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 601–02 (“The class action thus instituted was not intended to 
be litigated. Rather, within the space of a single day, . . . the settling parties . . . presented to 
the District Court a complaint, an answer, a proposed settlement agreement, and a joint 
motion for conditional class certification.”). 
 119. Id. at 626–28 (discussing subclasses). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831–32. 
[T]he District Court took no steps at the outset to ensure that the potentially 
conflicting interests of easily identifiable categories of claimants be protected by 
provisional certification of subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4), relying instead on its post 
hoc findings at the fairness hearing that these subclasses in fact had been adequately 
represented. 
Id. 
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adequate representation.122 In particular, the Ortiz Court 
condemned the district and circuit courts’ “uncritical adoption . . . 
of figures agreed upon by the parties.”123 The Court emphasized that 
courts must “rigorous[ly] adhere[] to those provisions of the Rule 
‘designed to protect absentees,’”124 and also noted that “the moment 
of certification requires ‘heightene[d] attention’ . . . to the 
justifications for binding the class members.”125 Thus, when 
presented with a settlement, even one with seemingly desirable terms 
that efficiently resolves many thousands of claims, a court must 
nevertheless rigorously scrutinize whether the adequacy of 
representation126 necessary to bind the absent class members has 
been provided.127 
Large-scale “aggregate litigation” may be possible and desirable 
in many cases. But class actions are not merely large-scale “aggregate 
litigation”—class actions are something more and something 
different. The representative nature of class litigation renders class 
actions distinctive, goes to the core of the purpose of class litigation, 
and implicates constitutional due process concerns. Unfortunately, 
however, as explored in the next Part, a number of recent proposals 
in the legal commentary seek to reconstruct class action reality in a 
 
 122. Id. at 857–59, 863–64. 
 123. Id. at 848. 
 124. Id. at 849 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Relying on the language of Rule 23(a), courts and commentators often ascribe the 
burden of providing adequate representation to class counsel and class representatives. See 1 
CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 14, § 3:21, at 408 (noting that, with respect to adequacy of 
representation, “the representatives must not possess interests which are antagonistic to the 
interests of the class,” and “the representatives’ counsel must be qualified, experienced, and 
generally able to conduct the litigation”). However, the burdens of adequate representation, 
while falling most directly on class counsel and the class representatives, are also shared by 
defense counsel, the defendant, and the court. See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Defendant’s 
Obligation To Ensure Adequate Representation in Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 511 
(2006). 
 127. See Alan B. Morrison, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A 
Brief Reply to Professors Kahan and Silberman, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1179, 1187 (1998). 
Far from being a nice addition if it is available, adequate representation, along with 
notice and an opportunity to participate (and in some cases the right to opt out), are 
the essential elements that legitimize the class action and entitle the defendant to 
use a prior class judgment or settlement as a bar to future litigation by everyone who 
is part of the certified class. 
Id. 
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manner that ignores the representative nature of class actions in favor 
of an exclusively aggregate focus. 
V. THE DRAWBACKS OF AN “AGGREGATE” FOCUS: PROPOSALS TO 
CONSTRUCT A NEW CLASS ACTION REALITY 
Despite the Supreme Court’s repeated emphasis on adequate 
representation as essential to constitutional due process, and thus to 
the validity of class judgments, there is a clear push in the legal 
literature to undermine that concept. In light of some of the highly 
publicized difficulties and issues in class action practice, it is not 
surprising that legal commentators would offer proposals that 
attempt to address these difficulties and issues. But the number of 
prominent proposals that would reconstruct class action reality with 
an aggregate foundation and focus—as a method of mere claim 
disposal and at the expense of constitutional due process 
safeguards—is remarkable, if not astonishing. 
If evidence suggested that the “adequate representation” 
prerequisite required such a high threshold that many potential class 
members were being excluded from a class-wide remedy, perhaps 
this would warrant an increased emphasis on the aggregate. But this 
is not the case. Accordingly, a shift away from the representative 
nature of class actions—a shift that would lower constitutional due 
process protections—should require especially careful scrutiny before 
recommendation. Yet precisely such a shift in approach and emphasis 
appears frequently in the legal literature. For example, prominent 
proposals have advocated (1) treating the class as an “entity client,” 
(2) incorporating economic perspectives and administrative law 
concepts to class action practice, and (3) sharply restricting the 
availability of collateral attacks of class judgments. All of these 
innovative proposals share a common net effect: to reconstruct the 
class action reality with an aggregate foundation and focus. I 
examine each of these examples in turn. 
A. Example One: Class as an “Entity Client” 
One proposal in the legal literature would recast class actions 
using an “entity client” model. The notion of the class as an “entity 
client” envisions the entity—meaning the class—“[as both] the 
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litigant and the client.”128 Thus, the class itself becomes the lawyer’s 
client, rather than the individuals who comprise the class. According 
to its major proponent, under this entity approach, “the class (like 
other litigating entities [such as trade unions, corporations, 
municipalities and other governmental entities129]) is the client, and 
its members should play a role not as clients themselves but as 
representatives of the client.”130  
[In an entity approach,] the broader social interests at stake need to 
be recognized . . . , since the measure of efficiency and due process 
does require a balancing of the interest of the individual against the 
other social concerns that are affected. In this case, the [entity] 
model seems preferable both for the administration of the civil 
justice system and for the interests of litigants other than the 
plaintiff class.131 
Treating the class as the client eliminates several issues that 
currently arise in class litigation. In the “class as client” model, 
potential conflicts of interest among the class members are no longer 
disqualifying and, in fact, are no longer relevant. Similarly, because 
the class is the client, rather than the individuals comprising the class, 
a large number of opt-outs is no longer a concern—because class 
members would no longer be permitted to opt out of the class 
litigation.132 
By shifting the focus to the class as a whole, an entity client 
approach to class actions adopts an aggregate foundation and 
focus.133 Indeed, the entity client proposal would adversely affect two 
 
 128. Shapiro, supra note 15, at 919. 
 129. See id. at 921. 
 130. Id. at 940. 
 131. Id. at 933. 
 132. Id. at 918–19. 
[T]he aggregation model . . . allow[s] individuals to achieve the benefits of pooling 
resources against a common adversary. . . . [In the entity model,] the entity is the 
litigant and the client. Moreover, in the situations in which class action treatment is 
warranted, the individual who is a member of the class, for whatever purpose, is and 
must remain a member of that class, and as a result must tie his fortunes to those of 
the group with respect to the litigation, its progress, and its outcome. 
Id. 
 133. Although Professor Shapiro draws a distinction between an entity model and an 
aggregation model, the entity model ultimately emphasizes the bringing together of claims 
(albeit as an entity) rather than emphasizing the due process, fiduciary, and agency concepts 
that are central to the representative approach to class actions. See id. at 918–19 
(distinguishing between the “aggregation” and “entity” models). 
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of the “minimal procedural due process protections” required in 
class actions:134 it would eliminate outright the right to opt out135 
and it would limit the necessity of notice.136 
The entity client proposal has far-reaching ramifications. In 
addition to eliminating opt-outs and limiting notice requirements, an 
entity approach would alter the application of the ethical rules to 
class actions.137 Other consequences to jurisdiction138 and choice of 
law139 would also appear to follow. In other words, an entity 
approach to class actions would permit procedural streamlining, but 
at the expense of limiting or even eliminating rights and options that 
currently protect class members, including due process safeguards.140 
 
 134. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985). 
 135. See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 957 (“[A]n absolute opt-out right in [(b)(3) classes] 
would undermine the validity of class treatment itself [under an entity approach].”). 
 136. See id. at 936–37 (discussing notice under an entity approach). 
If [the cost of notice is high], then the arguments for viewing the class as the litigant 
militate in favor of more selective notice, so long as an adequately representative 
group of the class (or of each potential subclass) is notified. . . . In the case of the 
“small claim” class action, requiring notice to all those members whose whereabouts 
are reasonably accessible seems even less sensible. The interest of the individual in 
the case is relatively low, as is the corresponding likelihood that any member of the 
class will wish to spend the time and energy to monitor the action or will object to 
the very idea of class treatment. In these circumstances, to insist on the widest 
possible notice is to use “due process” notions as a method of effectively defeating 
the claim at the threshold and depriving the polity of any social value it might have. 
It is far better to provide for sufficient notice to make a representative group aware 
of the action, so that the opportunity to object either to certification or to the 
progress or handling of the action is not lost, while keeping the cost of such notice 
within manageable bounds. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 137. An “entity” approach appears in some of the class-action literature in the context of 
conflict of interest concerns. See Bassett, supra note 5, at 975 n.232 (arguing against a “class as 
entity” approach to conflicts of interest); Moore, supra note 32, at 1477 (proposing that 
classes should be treated as entity clients for purposes of the ethical rules); see also Charles 
Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in Allocating Settlement 
Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1484–91 (1998) (discussing differences between treating class 
members as a single unit rather than individuals for conflict of interest purposes). 
 138. See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 13, 28–29 (1996) (discussing implications of treating the class as an entity in the areas of 
subject-matter and personal jurisdiction). 
 139. See id. at 29 (discussing implications of treating the class as an entity for choice of 
law considerations). 
 140. The entity client proposal is susceptible to some serious challenges even aside from 
its aggregate focus. For example, each of the other entity-clients listed as analogous examples—
trade unions, corporations, municipalities, and other governmental entities—has an existence 
and an organizational structure independent of litigation, whereas the class in a class action is 
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In short, the entity client proposal shifts the focus from the 
individual class members to the class as a whole, and in doing so, 
distances the adequacy evaluation from the individual class members. 
To assert that such an individual may be lumped together with 
others against her will, with no right to opt out and limited rights to 
notice—simply because it is more efficient—is indeed to reconstruct 
class action reality away from a representative approach and toward a 
view that values efficiency more than due process. 
B. Example Two: Economic Perspectives and  
Analogies to Administrative Proceedings 
A second example of a recent attempt to reconstruct class action 
reality involves proposals that have attempted to import 
administrative law processes and law-and-economics approaches to 
the class action arena.141 The recent popularity of law and 
economics,142 and the application of economic principles to a broad 
variety of topics in the legal literature,143 renders proposals for similar 
extensions to the class action context unsurprising. Equally 
unsurprising, in light of the centrality of efficiency to the wealth 
maximization and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency concepts of law-and-
economics theory,144 such approaches would reconstruct class action 
reality with an aggregate focus. 
 
created for the sole and exclusive purpose of litigation. This reality, I would suggest, renders it 
much more difficult to treat the class as an entity when there is no separate entity existence. 
 141. These proposals overlap with each other. Daphne Barak-Erez, The Administrative 
Process as a Domain of Conflicting Interests, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 193, 199 (2005) 
(“There is a growing tendency to consider administrative law in light of the economic and 
social justifications of regulation.”). They also overlap with the previous “entity client” 
example. See Silver & Baker, supra note 137, at 1465 (“From an economic perspective, [mass 
actions and class actions] . . . resemble corporations.”). 
 142. See Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997 
WIS. L. REV. 433, 434 (“Law and economics has been one of the most successful innovations 
in the legal academy in the last century.”). 
 143. See Jay S. Marks, An Economic Analysis of Agency Behavior, 5 ADMIN. L.J. 127, 139 
(1991) (“Today, there are literally hundreds of articles applying economic analysis to the law in 
numerous fields . . . .”). 
 144. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 717, 779 
(2005) (“[T]he normative premise . . . motivating law and economics scholarship . . . [is] 
efficiency.”); Ugo Mattei, The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge Guido 
Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REV. 220, 224 (2005) (“[L]aw and economics [is] an approach to legal 
reasoning grounded in efficiency concerns.”); Gary Minda, Reflections, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2397, 2399 (2005) (noting “[t]he efficiency hypothesis of the law and economics 
movement”); Paul H. Rubin, Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and Demand, 13 SUP. 
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One proposal brings both themes together to view class actions 
“more along the lines of representation in other lawmaking 
processes—the most closely analogous being that of administrative 
agencies,”145 explaining that “the law may advance regulatory 
objectives through the structuring and facilitation of markets.”146 
This proposal then goes on to analogize administrative agencies to 
class counsel,147 and to import administrative law and regulatory 
policy to class actions.148 
The time has come for a conception of the modern class action less 
as a cousin of ordinary civil litigation and more as that device 
actually operates today, as a rival regime of governance. . . . [I]n 
parsing the process due to absent class members, the law should 
draw upon the lessons that have emerged in the modern 
administrative state and the regulatory enterprise that it oversees.149 
This proposal acknowledges that under administrative law, 
“[a]ffected persons are entitled as a matter of constitutional due 
process to an individualized ‘opportunity to be heard’ in 
adjudication but not in rulemaking.”150 However, the proposal 
 
CT. ECON. REV. 19, 19 (2005) (“Efficiency is the key organizing principle behind law and 
economics.”); see also Reza Dibadj, Weasel Numbers, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1325, 1330 (2006) 
(“Unable to equate ‘efficiency’ or ‘wealth maximization’ with Pareto optimality, the standard 
trick in the law and economics repertoire has been to devolve to the Kaldor-Hicks standard.”). 
See generally Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 509, 509-15 (1980) (discussing wealth maximization and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
concepts). 
 145. Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 287, 292 (2003) [hereinafter Nagareda, Administering Adequacy]. Professor Nagareda’s 
previous work has made similar arguments. See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle 
and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (2003); Richard A. Nagareda, 
Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899 (1996) [hereinafter Nagareda, 
Tort to Administration]. Professor Molot has also drawn an administrative law analogy to the 
judicial review of class action settlements. See Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a 
New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 112 (2003). But see Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 1015, 1025–32 (2001) (noting the shortcomings of administrative procedures and 
arguing that negotiated rulemaking by agencies should draw upon the procedures of class 
action law). 
 146. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 145, at 348. 
 147. Id. at 350–51. 
 148. Id. at 350–69. 
 149. Id. at 380. 
 150. Id. at 354 (citing United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 244–45 
(1973)). 
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would deny an individualized opportunity to be heard in class 
actions and would substitute a “reasoned explanation” for the 
settlement reached,151 relying on “market discipline”152 to subject 
defective settlements “to criticism by potential competitors within 
the plaintiffs’ bar.”153 
Determining the propriety of an administrative law analogy to 
class actions requires an examination of the administrative law 
process. Administrative proceedings differ significantly from 
traditional litigation in a number of respects, all of which are less 
protective of individual rights154—including less restrictive 
evidentiary rules, the absence of an Article III judge, in some 
instances the absence of counsel, and, most relevant to this article, 
lessened due process protections.155 As one commentator recently 
explained, “administrative decision-making should be understood as 
devoted to balancing between conflicting interests of individuals or 
groups, usually when none of the affected parties has predefined legal 
rights that are relevant to the substantial content of the 
administrative decision.”156 However, the reason for the filing of a 
class action is precisely because the class members have predefined, 
but as yet undetermined, legal rights: the class members already 
possess a property right, and the class action serves as the process for 
 
 151. Id. at 359. 
 152. Id. at 365. 
 153. Id. at 363. 
 154. See John G. White, ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy in 
Action, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229, 239 (2001) (noting, with respect to administrative 
proceedings, the “highly expedited nature of administrative proceedings,” the “relative lack of 
formal due process,” and the “relative difficulty in assessing complex factual questions”) 
(quoting Raj Vasant Pandit v. Vishal Bhuta, DeC, No. AF-0224 (July 10, 2000), available at 
http://www.disputes.org/decisions/0224.htm). See generally Rex R. Perschbacher, 
Rethinking Collateral Estoppel: Limiting the Preclusive Effect of Administrative Determinations 
in Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 422, 452–55 (1983) (noting the informality of 
administrative proceedings). 
 155. See Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 145, at 380 (“[I]n parsing the 
process due to absent class members, the law should draw upon the lessons that have emerged 
in the modern administrative state and the regulatory enterprises that it oversees.”). 
 156. Barak-Erez, supra note 141, at 193 (emphasis added). Barak-Erez provides examples 
of appropriate regulations and regulatory decisions, including acceptable levels of pollution and 
the allocation of educational resources, such as the number of students per classroom. Id. at 
194–95. But see ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM (1968) (arguing that 
the definition of the common good is not necessarily an aggregation of individual preferences); 
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1511 (1992) (same). 
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securing the remedy to which they legally are entitled (or 
determining they have none). 
The task of balancing between conflicting interests is characteristic 
of the legislative process. Legislation is a process aimed at balancing 
between the interests of various groups. No one can claim a right 
to the legislation of a statute favorable to his or her interests. In 
contrast, the judicial process is based on the premise that the court 
has to decide on the proper application of a legal right to the facts 
of the case. In so doing, the court takes into consideration 
competing social interests, but the underlying assumption is that 
rights, and not only interests, govern the decision . . . . 
 With this in mind, the resemblance of the administrative 
regulatory process to the legislative process becomes evident. Both 
processes are aimed at balancing between conflicting interests, and 
both are clearly distributive.157 
The analogy of class actions to administrative proceedings does 
fit, but only in a narrow set of circumstances. Most commonly, after 
the conclusion of traditional litigation to establish liability, some 
courts have employed procedures resembling administrative 
proceedings—such as individualized claim hearings—to determine 
individualized remedies.158 And a few distinctive class action 
settlements have proposed what has been described as “a private 
administrative compensation scheme—a kind of miniature 
administrative agency, if you will.”159 However, one of the cases cited 
for this proposition160 was the lower court decision in what 
ultimately became Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,161 in which the 
Supreme Court ultimately rejected the proposed settlement for lack 
 
 157. Barak-Erez, supra note 141, at 195–96 (footnotes omitted). 
 158. See, e.g., Kraszewski v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. C-70-1261 TEH, 
1986 WL 11746, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 1986) (“After a bifurcated trial on liability, . . . this 
court found defendants liable under Title VII for sex discrimination on a class-wide basis. 
Now, at Stage II of the proceedings, the court must determine the appropriate relief to 
compensate the plaintiff class members.”); id. at *3 (“[T]he court hereby orders individual 
hearings for the Stage II proceedings in this case.”). 
 159. Nagareda, Tort to Administration, supra note 145, at 921. 
 160. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 157 F.R.D. 246 (D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83 F.3d 610 
(3d Cir. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); see Nagareda, Tort to Administration, supra note 
145, at 921 n.83. 
 161. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
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of adequate representation.162 Thus, from the Supreme Court’s 
perspective and from a representative focus, the administrative law 
analogy is of a more limited utility than some scholars seem to 
suggest. To extend this narrow analogy to the infinitely broader area 
of adequate representation—the sine qua non of the representative 
nature of class actions—is to substitute an aggregate focus. 
Analogizing class actions to administrative proceedings is a 
reconstruction of class action reality, and one with an indisputably 
“aggregate” focus. “In the most general terms, the rationale 
underlying the existence and operation of administrative agencies is 
that they serve the so-called ‘public interest.’ This public interest is, 
however, an aggregation of interests of individuals and groups that 
form society.”163 Indeed, “[t]he aggregation of interests has 
sometimes been considered a primary purpose of administrative 
law.”164 Thus, under an administrative model, the purpose of class 
actions would shift from a goal of according appropriate relief to 
each class member, to instead reaching a decision that is merely 
distributive by balancing among the conflicting interests of the class 
as a whole. The reconstruction is more dramatic than it might 
initially appear. The Supreme Court has previously noted that, for 
absent class members, adequate representation substitutes for the 
class member’s “day in court.”165 This “day in court” approach is 
reflected in the Court’s approach to the collateral attack of a class 
judgment, whereby a class member who was inadequately 
represented will not be bound by the class judgment.166 To 
reconstruct class action reality using an administrative law model 
would treat the conglomerate class as a whole, thereby substituting a 
“good enough” or “close enough” perspective for adequate 
representation—deeming a resolution sufficient so long as overall, 
rather than individual, fairness was achieved. 
 
 162. Id. at 625. 
 163. Barak-Erez, supra note 141, at 197. 
 164. Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1331 (1997) (citing Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1670 (1975)). 
 165. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (quoting 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 14, § 4449), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 
105 Stat. 1071, 1076–77 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000)). 
 166. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
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C. Example Three: Limiting Collateral Attacks  
Against Class Judgments 
The third example of a recent attempt to reconstruct class action 
reality involves proposals to limit collateral attacks against class 
judgments. The calls to limit collateral attacks on class judgments 
undermine the importance of the class action’s representative nature 
by overemphasizing the aggregate element and raising attendant 
dangers. 
A collateral attack is “[a]n attack on a judgment in a proceeding 
other than a direct appeal; [especially] an attempt to undermine a 
judgment through a judicial proceeding in which the ground of the 
proceeding (or a defense in the proceeding) is that the judgment is 
ineffective.”167 Since a class judgment ordinarily will bind all class 
members to that result,168 the ability to collaterally attack a class 
action judgment largely depends on whether the challenger’s 
interests were adequately represented in the first lawsuit.169 The 
Supreme Court has assured the availability of a collateral attack to 
 
 167. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 278. 
 168. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42–43 (“It is familiar doctrine in the federal courts that 
members of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment 
where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are present . . . .”); Graham C. 
Lilly, Modeling Class Actions: The Representative Suit as an Analytic Tool, 81 NEB. L. REV. 
1008, 1009 (2003) (“American law generally holds that when a properly structured class 
action is resolved by a judicial judgment, the entire class is bound.”); see also id. at 1019 
(“[T]hroughout the history of the modern class action in the United States, the Supreme 
Court has accepted the binding effect of the class judgment on absentees.”). See generally 18A 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4455, at 448 (“Preclusion by representation lies at the heart 
of the modern class action developed by such procedural rules as Civil Rule 23. The central 
purpose of each of the various forms of class action is to establish a judgment that will bind not 
only the representative parties but also all nonparticipating members of the class certified by 
the court.”). 
 169. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 396 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (“Final judgments . . . remain vulnerable to collateral attack for 
failure to satisfy the adequate representation requirement.”); see also 18A WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 14, § 4455, at 448 (“The most important requirement of preclusion is that the 
named parties afford adequate representation.”). Lilly similarly notes, 
[T]he basic constitutional principle has been to permit unnamed class members to 
challenge the adequacy of their representation in a collateral trial. If the court finds 
that the class (or certain members within it) was inadequately represented, the 
judgment as to the class (or individual within it) will be invalidated under the Due 
Process Clause. 
Lilly, supra note 168, at 1037 (citations omitted). 
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safeguard due process for absent class members for more than sixty-
five years—ever since Hansberry v. Lee.170 
Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co.171 provides an example of a 
collateral attack against a class action judgment—specifically, the 
class action settlement in In re “Agent Orange” Products Liability 
Litigation.172 In Agent Orange, the court took an aggregate 
approach, certifying a class that included those who served in the 
military “from 1961 to 1972 who were injured while in or near 
Vietnam by exposure to ‘Agent Orange’” as well as their families.173 
The court-approved settlement in Agent Orange provided that the 
defendants would create a $180 million settlement fund.174 Three-
quarters of the fund monies were distributed directly “to exposed 
veterans who suffer[ed] from long-term total disabilities and to the 
surviving spouses or children of exposed veterans who have died.”175 
The remaining one-quarter of the fund monies was allocated 
primarily to the “Agent Orange Class Assistance Program,” aimed at 
providing grants to agencies serving Vietnam veterans and their 
families.176 After these allocations, $10 million remained as a reserve 
for future claims.177 
The Agent Orange settlement expressly stated that the class 
“specifically includes persons who have not yet manifested injury,”178 
 
 170. 311 U.S. at 41–42. 
 171. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d by an equally 
divided Court, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (per curiam). 
 172. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), 
modified, 597 F. Supp. 740, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 173. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), 
aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 174. See id. app. A, at 863. 
 175. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 253. 
 176. Id.; see also Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig.), 611 
F. Supp. 1396, 1432 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), rev’d in part, 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting 
that the priorities of the Agent Orange Class Assistance Program included “the establishment 
of legal and social service projects to benefit Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange and 
suffering some disability and their families,” and that the first funding priority should be 
“[c]hildren with birth defects born to class member veterans”). 
 177. See In re “Agent Orange,” 597 F. Supp. at 870 app. B (stating, in the class action 
settlement notice, that a portion of the settlement fund “will be set aside for future payment to 
those class members who have not, as yet, manifested adverse health effects but who may 
manifest such effects in the future”); see also Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 252 (“The settlement 
provided that defendants would pay $180 million into a settlement fund, $10 million of which 
would indemnify defendants against future state court actions alleging the same claims.”). 
 178. In re “Agent Orange,” 597 F. Supp. app. A, at 865. 
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yet set aside only $10 million to pay such claims. This $10 million 
was subsequently transferred to the “Agent Orange Class Assistance 
Program” rather than kept as a reserve for future claimants.179 
Moreover, the settlement “only provided for recovery for those 
whose death or disability was discovered prior to 1994. . . . No 
provision was made for post-1994 claimants, and the settlement fund 
was permitted to terminate in 1994.”180 In a challenge to the Agent 
Orange settlement filed before the expiration of the settlement fund, 
the court justified the 1994 cutoff by noting that “[t]he relevant 
latency periods and the age of the veterans ensure that almost all 
valid claims will be revealed before that time.”181 
Future claimants were not a separate subclass in the Agent 
Orange case; indeed, there were no subclasses of any type.182 The 
adequacy of representation issue is obvious; the expectation of fewer 
claims after 1994 would justify maintaining a smaller post-1994 
reserve, rather than eliminating the reserve altogether.183 Having 
been intentionally and specifically swept within the class settlement, 
the future claimants who became ill after 1994 had the right to 
adequate representation.184 But by approaching the Agent Orange 
class action from a purely aggregate perspective, both the litigants 
and the court were focused on disposing of the claims—a focus 
which, as in Amchem, came at the expense of neglecting the key 
requirement of adequate representation. 
 
 179. See Koniak, supra note 15, at 1820 n.193. 
 180. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 260–61; see also id. at 253 (noting that no payments for 
“death or disability occurring after December 31, 1994” were permitted under the settlement 
(citing In re “Agent Orange,” 611 F. Supp. at 1417). 
 181. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 781 F. Supp. 902, 919 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 182. See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 252, 259–60. 
 183. In a subsequent law review article, Judge Weinstein, the district court judge who 
approved the Agent Orange settlement, stated his belief that the claims in the Agent Orange 
lawsuit lacked merit. See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. 
U. L. REV. 469, 543 (1994) (stating that, with respect to the Agent Orange litigation, “the 
law and science, in my view, did not support a viable cause of action”). Professor Koniak has 
opined that if the court believed the claims lacked merit, the proper result would have been to 
dismiss the entire lawsuit; a belief that the claims lacked merit would not excuse or justify 
inadequate representation. See Koniak, supra note 15, at 1826 n.217, 1826–28. 
 184. See Koniak, supra note 15, at 1821 (“[I]f the post-1994s . . . had been adequately 
represented, this deal would have provided something of substance for them—or their lawyer 
would have insisted that they be left out of it altogether. Put another way, such blatant bias for 
the presents, the near-futures and the non-injured—at the expense of people like Stephenson—
demonstrates that Stephenson was not adequately represented.”). 
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Enter Daniel Stephenson, who was exposed to Agent Orange 
during his tour of duty in Vietnam, but who was not diagnosed with 
cancer from that exposure until 1998—after the 1994 termination of 
the settlement fund.185 Stephenson sued the manufacturers of Agent 
Orange, who argued that the Agent Orange settlement precluded 
Stephenson’s suit. Although the district court dismissed 
Stephenson’s suit,186 the Second Circuit concluded that Stephenson 
had been denied adequate representation and thus had been denied 
due process187—a result affirmed when the Supreme Court split by a 
4-4 vote.188 
The legal literature reflects a rich debate over the propriety of 
collaterally attacking a class judgment as a general matter189 and of 
 
 185. See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 255 (noting that Stephenson “served in Vietnam from 
1965 to 1970, serving both on the ground in Vietnam and as a helicopter pilot in  
Vietnam. . . . On February 19, 1998, he was diagnosed with multiple myeloma . . . .”); see also 
Koniak, supra note 15, at 1818 (“In 1998, Stephenson was diagnosed with multiple myeloma, 
a deadly cancer that some studies connect to Agent Orange exposure.”). 
 186. See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 251 (vacating “the district court’s dismissal”). 
 187. Id. at 261 (“Because these plaintiffs were inadequately represented in the prior 
litigation, they were not proper parties and cannot be bound by the settlement.”). 
 188. Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (per curiam). 
 189. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Finality of Judgments in Class Actions: A Comment on 
Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1163–64 (1998) (criticizing the suggestion 
that class members should be able to attack adequacy of counsel collaterally); Marcel Kahan & 
Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State Courts in Class Actions Involving 
Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 262–66 (“[A]dequacy of representation 
should be raised directly, and not be permitted to be raised collaterally” when class members 
had a “fair opportunity to raise the issue.”); Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate 
Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
765, 779–83 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan & Silberman, Inadequate Search] (criticizing broad 
right to mount collateral attack upon adequacy of representation); Marcel Kahan & Linda 
Silberman, The Proper Role for Collateral Attack in Class Actions: A Reply to Allen, Miller, and 
Morrison, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1193 (1998) (responding to previous articles regarding the 
ability to collaterally attack a class judgment by arguing that those positions are inconsistent 
with the language and effect of existing case law); Geoffrey P. Miller, Full Faith and Credit to 
Settlements in Overlapping Class Actions: A Reply to Professors Kahan and Silberman, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1175 (1998) (calling for counsel “to establish a full record on adequacy 
in the fairness hearing”); Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 145, at 366 (stating 
that he “share[s the] inclination” of commentators who have called for limits on the ability to 
collaterally attack class judgments); Kevin R. Bernier, Note, The Inadequacy of the Broad 
Collateral Attack: Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Company and Its Effect on Class Action 
Settlements, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1023 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court should adopt a 
limited standard for collateral attacks against class judgments). But see Koniak, supra note 15, 
at 1794 (“Those who argue against an unfettered right of absentees to mount a collateral 
attack based on inadequacy of representation bemoan the lack of finality to class action 
settlements that right creates. Due process is, however, always in tension with efficiency, speed 
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Daniel Stephenson’s collateral attack specifically.190 Indeed, this 
debate has drawn a number of influential voices, many of whom urge 
an aggregate-oriented outcome, albeit through different approaches. 
Some prominent voices within this debate assert that the trial 
court necessarily determines the existence (or lack) of adequate 
representation as part of the class suit, and thus any challenges to the 
trial court’s adequacy of representation determination should be 
limited to direct appeal.191 In other words, advocates of this approach 
contend that since absent class members conceivably could have 
shown up to contest adequacy of representation during the trial 
court hearing, their failure to do so should preclude any collateral 
challenge. 
It is perhaps hard to imagine an argument any more diametrically 
opposed to the idea of the representative nature of class actions than 
the one proffered in the preceding paragraph, and this territory has 
been fiercely contested.192 In particular, the notion that absent class 
 
and finality.”); Monaghan, supra note 79, at 1200 (supporting the right to collaterally attack 
class judgments based on inadequate representation); Woolley, supra note 89, at 433–38 
(arguing that the ability to mount a collateral attack on a judgment is an important safeguard 
to ensure that class members receive a hearing on the merits of a case). 
 190. See, e.g., Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 145, at 316–20 (criticizing 
the Second Circuit’s decision in Stephenson and characterizing the Supreme Court’s deadlock 
as a “missed opportunity”); Bernier, supra note 189, at 1024 (arguing that by deadlocking in 
Stephenson, the Supreme Court “missed an opportunity” and should adopt a limited standard 
for collateral attacks against class judgments). 
 191. See, e.g., Kahan & Silberman, Inadequate Search, supra note 189, at 782–86, 788–
89 (contending that collateral attacks should not be permitted to challenge the adequacy of 
representation if the original forum made a finding of adequacy based on appropriate 
procedures). Other commentators have explored the shortcomings of this approach in detail. 
See Woolley, supra note 89, at 390–422 (refuting the arguments of Professors Kahan and 
Silberman). 
 192. Commentators have explored the shortcomings of this approach in detail. See 
Woolley, supra note 89, at 383, 390–422 (refuting the arguments of Professors Kahan and 
Silberman); see also id. at 397 (observing that to require absent class members to raise adequacy 
objections in the class suit itself “would be inconsistent with the representative nature of class 
suits, a fact underlined by the lack of authority for such an approach under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23”). For example, Professor Koniak notes: 
[A]t its core, [Professors Kahan and Silberman’s argument is] a form of waiver 
argument. You chose not to object; you have waived your chance to contest 
adequacy. And for that reason it is disingenuous at its core: absent class members are 
not supposed to all show up and contest matters. Notices, in fact, make clear that 
staying away is a perfectly appropriate response. Having invited passivity, indeed 
depending upon just such passivity, what kind of legal system would then penalize 
it? Not one committed to “due process.” 
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members must challenge adequacy of representation at the fairness 
hearing or in a direct appeal is undermined by language from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, which 
expressly states that due to the very representative nature of class 
actions, absent class members are “not required to do anything.”193 
Rule 23 itself, through the responsibilities imposed on the class 
representative, similarly undermines the argument that absent class 
members must participate in either the fairness hearing or a direct 
appeal in order to challenge adequacy of representation.194 Thus, the 
suggestion that absent class members must raise any adequacy 
challenge in the initial proceedings or on direct appeal is inconsistent 
with the understanding of both Rule 23 and the case law regarding 
 
Koniak, supra note 15, at 1851. Other relatively recent Supreme Court decisions also suggest 
the continued vitality of collateral attacks against class judgments. See Richards v. Jefferson 
County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996) (permitting a collateral attack in a taxpayer class action where 
the challengers were not adequately represented in the first lawsuit); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 
755, 762–63 (1989) (rejecting the contention that a collateral attack was not permitted 
because the challengers had failed to intervene in the initial proceedings), superseded by statute, 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1074, 1076–77. The 
Supreme Court recently held that an unnamed class member who objected at the fairness 
hearing should be considered a “party” for purposes of appealing the court’s approval of the 
settlement. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 7, 10 (2002). However, the Court cast Devlin 
very narrowly and the case would appear to deal only with direct appeals, adding nothing to 
arguments concerning the ability of an unnamed class member to launch a collateral attack. See 
id. at 15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating conclusion in narrow terms); see also Koniak, supra note 
15, at 1856–57 (concluding that Devlin should be read narrowly). 
 193. 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985) (“[A]bsent plaintiff class members . . . need not hire 
counsel or appear. . . . [A]n absent class-action plaintiff is not required to do anything. He may 
sit back and allow the litigation to run its course, content in knowing that there are safeguards 
provided for his protection.”). In a related context, the Supreme Court has held that the 
failure to intervene cannot prohibit a collateral attack. See Martin, 490 U.S. at 763 (1989) 
(“[A] party seeking a judgment binding on another cannot obligate that person to intervene 
. . . .”). 
 194. See Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 76 (5th Cir. 1973). 
The purpose of Rule 23 would be subverted by requiring a class member who learns 
of a pending suit involving a class of which he is a part to monitor that litigation to 
make certain that his interests are being protected; this is not his responsibility—it is 
the responsibility of the class representative to protect the interests of all class 
members. 
Id.; see also Woolley, supra note 89, at 432 (“[V]irtually all avenues for precluding or limiting 
absent class members from collaterally attacking a judgment are foreclosed by the 
Constitution[;] . . . current class action rules impose no . . . obligation [upon absent class 
members to intervene if they wish to object to inadequate representation, and instead] permit 
all absent class members to collaterally attack a judgment for inadequate representation, even if 
they could have raised their objection in the class proceedings.”). 
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the role and responsibilities of absent class members and with the 
fundamental representative nature of class actions.195 
Another voice in the commentary posits that any challenges to 
adequacy of representation must be founded in information known 
at the time of the class judgment—meaning that collateral attacks 
based on post-judgment information, such as Stephenson’s illness 
after expiration of the Agent Orange settlement fund, should not be 
permitted.196 This argument, too, has been vigorously criticized.197 
As Professor Koniak has observed: 
If the defendant wanted to be released from all liability to those 
who might get sick after 1994, those claims were worth 
something—and that something belonged to anyone who got sick 
after 1994. To have one lawyer who represents everyone in the 
class agree to transfer the value of the post-1994 releases to those 
who got sick before 1994 is to accept a lawyer operating with a 
conflict that actually adversely affects a segment of the class. If the 
post-1994 claims were worthless, the defendant should have been 
willing to exempt those claims from the class settlement. A lawyer 
adequately representing the post-1994 interests would have 
demanded something for the release from liability or demanded any 
such claims be excised from the class settlement.198 
 
 195. See Woolley, supra note 89, at 394 (“[C]lass action rules and statutes do not require 
absent class members to raise adequacy objections in the class suit itself. Thus, absent class 
members may collaterally attack a judgment based on inadequate representation.”). 
 196. See Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 145, at 297 (“[T]he interests of 
class members may be aligned, if at all, only prejudgment, not postjudgment. Divergence of 
interest within the class that emerges only postjudgment—that does not preexist the class—
cannot serve as a basis on which to deny preclusive effect to a class judgment, else the law 
would make finality well nigh impossible to achieve in any class settlement.”). 
 197. See Koniak, supra note 15, at 1822 n.198 (discussing problems raised by Professor 
Nagareda’s approach). 
 198. Id. The theoretical basis for the use of only pre-judgment information relies on an 
analogy of class actions to administrative proceedings. The commentator advocating this 
approach acknowledges that his “crucial insight . . . that the interests of class members may be 
aligned, if at all, only prejudgment, not postjudgment” is not an insight shared by the Supreme 
Court. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 145, at 297 (stating that this insight 
“eluded the Court in Hansberry and . . . continues to elude the law to present day”). Professor 
Nagareda criticizes “three ill-chosen words in Shutts”—the Court’s reference to the Due 
Process Clause as requiring adequate representation of absent class members’ interests “at all 
times”—as “hav[ing] led astray an entire line of academic commentary on adequate class 
representation.” Id. Interestingly, Professor Nagareda’s own argument is subject to precisely 
the same criticism, because his proposal is based on an isolated phrase in Shutts—identified as a 
quote from Moore’s Federal Practice treatise—stating that a class action can resemble a “quasi-
administrative proceeding,” but providing no further comment, explanation, endorsement, or 
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The arguments proffered in favor of limiting collateral attacks 
uniformly include the aggregate-oriented goal of finality of 
judgments and the impact of the ability to collaterally attack a class 
judgment upon class action settlements—and a necessarily 
concomitant discounting of the constitutionally-mandated due 
process prerequisite of adequate representation.199 
Those seeking to limit the ability of absent class members to 
collaterally attack a class judgment argue that, in effect, other 
aggregate-oriented considerations—judicial economy, court 
congestion, the promotion of settlements, and the desirability of 
finality—should outweigh the adequate representation of absent class 
members.200 These arguments, of course, are consistent with the view 
of class actions as mere “aggregate litigation,” with a focus on 
disposing of numerous claims in an expedient manner, and are 
inconsistent with a representative focus.201 
The emphasis on the aggregate in these recent proposals is more 
than just a shift in emphasis; it presages a reconstruction of class 
action reality. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected an 
aggregate approach to class actions (as contrasted with a 
 
edification. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809 (quoting 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.45 (1984)). Nearly 40 years ago, in discussing an opt-in procedure 
for class actions, a law review article posited a narrow analogy between class actions and 
administrative proceedings, but importantly, drew this analogy only with respect to certain 
types of class actions—and did not attempt to generalize such a notion to class actions as a 
whole. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendment of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397–98 (1967) (Expressing 
concern that an opt-in procedure “would result in freezing out the claims of people—especially 
small claims held by small people—who for one reason or another, ignorance, timidity, 
unfamiliarity with business or legal matters, will simply not take the affirmative step. . . . For 
them the class action serves something like the function of an administrative proceeding where 
scattered individual interests are represented by the Government.”). 
 199. See Sara Maurer, Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson: Class Action Catch 22, 55 S.C. 
L. REV. 467, 480 (2004) (“Efficiency and judicial administration are not served when any class 
member can question the finality of a judgment. Also, defendants will be less likely to settle if 
there exists the possibility that the settlement will not end the litigation with finality.”). 
 200. See Koniak, supra note 15, at 1794. 
 201. The volume—in terms of both number and intensity—of the reaction against 
collateral attacks of class judgments is curious in light of its relative rarity. See Koniak, supra 
note 15, at 1857 (“[T]here is no evidence whatsoever that absent class members are clogging 
the courts with collateral attacks anywhere. And they never have.”); Mollie A. Murphy, The 
Intersystem Class Settlement: Of Comity, Consent, and Collusion, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 413, 469 
(1999) (“Collateral attack has been used relatively sparingly to attack . . . adequacy of 
representation . . . .”); Woolley, supra note 89, at 443 (“Notwithstanding the longstanding 
availability of collateral attack, such attacks have not been common . . . .”). 
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representative approach) and has instead repeatedly insisted on the 
adequate representation of absent class members at the expense of 
global settlements and court dockets. An emphasis on the aggregate 
distorts the viewing lens. Judicial economy, resolution, and finality 
are laudable goals as a general matter. But when the impetus to 
dispose of the aggregated claims becomes the focus, “tunnel vision” 
almost necessarily results, leading to the neglect of claimants’ 
interests and the denial of due process. Imposing limits on the ability 
to collaterally attack a class judgment means removing the safeguard 
for someone who was not provided adequate representation—and 
binding her to a judgment even when rendered as the result of 
proceedings that denied her constitutional due process and basic 
fairness. 
D. Conclusion: The Hazards of Reconstructing Class Action Reality 
with an “Aggregate” Foundation and Focus 
Influential voices have proposed to reconstruct our image of class 
actions to focus on the aggregate nature of class actions, with a 
concomitant emphasis on clearing court dockets, reaching global 
settlements, and limiting collateral attacks on class judgments.202 
Such an approach employs a constricted view of class actions as 
simply one means of disposing of a large number of claims—indeed, 
as merely “aggregate” litigation.203 Unfortunately, however, viewing 
class actions merely as “aggregate litigation” interjects genuine 
dangers into class litigation—including truncated court review and 
oversight of class settlements, diminished attention to adequate 
representation as a general matter, and ultimately, an increased risk 
that class members are denied constitutional due process and basic 
fairness, which raises the possibility of more collateral attacks. 
Why would commentators propose a reconstruction of class 
action reality that adopts an aggregate foundation and focus? One 
reason is that this aggregate focus is part of a larger trend. The trend 
toward viewing the primary goal of the class action as claim 
disposal—the aggregate view of efficiency—is also seen in the law 
 
 202. See supra notes 128–140, 145–53, 163–166, 191, 196, 200–201 and accompanying 
text (providing examples). 
 203. An undue emphasis on the expeditious disposal of claims has ramifications beyond 
the class action context. See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 
B.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004) (arguing that the attempts “to streamline and expedite litigation . . . 
are drastically obscuring and reducing both the visibility and the application of legal norms”). 
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more generally and broadly. Indeed, the notion of “dispute 
resolution” is often seen as the primary focus of, and perhaps even a 
synonym for, law itself.204 Accordingly, a similar emphasis on the 
efficiency of the class action device—the inherent ability of a class 
action to dispose of numerous claims within a single proceeding—
perhaps should come as no surprise. However, treating law and 
litigation generally, and treating class actions specifically, as mere 
mechanisms for “dispute resolution” is an erroneous, harmful, and 
simplistic approach, permitting other purposes and goals to be 
disregarded and discarded.205 The courts already face an inherent 
temptation to treat class actions in an aggregate manner,206 and such 
an aggregate approach often lies behind court approvals of class 
settlements without rigorous scrutiny. As the Second Circuit has 
warned, “The systemic urge to aggregate litigation must not be 
allowed to trump our dedication to individual justice, and we must 
take care that each individual plaintiff’s—and defendant’s—cause not 
be lost in the shadow of a towering mass of litigation.”207 
Another potential reason motivating these recent proposals 
appears to be undue deference to defendants. For example, proposals 
to limit the ability to collaterally attack a class judgment routinely 
claim that without such restrictions, defendants will refuse to settle. 
Certainly the adequate representation prerequisite creates additional 
burdens for both litigation and settlement, and thus can hinder 
prompt settlement in some cases. However, the adequate 
representation prerequisite is not aimed at streamlining settlements; 
it is intended to ensure due process. Moreover, it is not self-evident 
that defendants will decline to settle absent prohibitions against 
collateral attack. Not only are collateral attacks against class 
judgments uncommon,208 but class judgments do not “capture” all 
potential class members in any event, due to the ability of class 
 
 204. Id. at 13–14. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in 
Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1062 (2002) (noting 
that full dockets, combined with judicial resources required of class actions and praise judges 
receive for concluding cases quickly, conspire to “suppress[] judicial scrutiny of proposed [class 
action] settlements”). 
 207. In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 853 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 208. See supra note 201 (discussing the rarity of collateral attacks against class 
judgments). 
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members to “opt out” of most class actions.209 The rule-mandated 
ability to opt out has not prevented defendants from entering into 
settlement agreements over the past four decades, and the rare 
collateral attack seems similarly unlikely to impede settlements. 
In effect, recent commentary has tended to use one component 
of the aggregate construct to justify the other aggregate component. 
The aggregate nature of class actions presents two underlying 
concerns—numbers (“numerous” parties) and judicial economy. 
Recent commentary has used the numbers concern as the means to 
an end—as a justification for proposing measures with a judicial 
economy focus. But this emphasis on judicial economy has 
overshadowed the more compelling argument: the argument that 
the aggregate nature of class actions—meaning the presence of 
numerous parties—is the reason why adequate representation 
matters. Precisely because a class action involves numerous parties, 
representation issues are more challenging and adequate 
representation is more difficult to achieve. The emphasis on judicial 
economy glosses over the more interesting, more challenging, and 
constitutionally-based problem of achieving adequate representation 
in the context of numerous parties. 
Reconstructing the class action reality as one of mere “aggregate 
litigation,” with single-minded goals of clearing court dockets and 
reaching global settlements, can lead judges to approve settlements 
too readily, relying on counsel’s assertions regarding the settlement’s 
desirability instead of undertaking close examination and scrutiny.210 
An aggregate focus will almost inevitably curtail the adequacy of the 
representation in the eager quest for resolution.211 One prominent 
example involved Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, in which 
attorneys filed, and the district court approved, a class action seeking 
a global settlement of all current and future asbestos-related claims 
 
 209. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring that the individual notice in (b)(3) class 
actions state, among other things, “that the court will exclude from the class any member who 
requests exclusion”). 
 210. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 848 (1999) (reproaching the 
lower courts’ “uncritical adoption . . . of figures agreed upon by the parties”). 
 211. Professor Koniak has chronicled some of the problems arising in this area. See, e.g., 
Koniak, supra note 15, at 1800–36 (discussing Epstein, BancBoston, and Stephenson cases); see 
also Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1056 (1995) [hereinafter Koniak, Widow Weeps] (discussing Amchem 
case). 
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for twenty manufacturers of asbestos products.212 As Professor 
Koniak has so powerfully described,213 the lawyers involved in the 
settlement—both class counsel and defense counsel—crafted two 
deals. One deal was the global settlement for which they sought 
court approval in the Amchem case; the other deal involved pre-
existing clients—the clients whom class counsel and others were 
representing at the time defense counsel approached them about a 
global settlement. The two deals had different terms, and the pre-
existing clients received the better deal.214 Adequate representation, 
of course, is a prerequisite to maintaining a class action, even one 








 212. 521 U.S. 591, 597, 601–02 (1997). 
 213. See generally Koniak, Widow Weeps, supra note 211 (describing the events in the 
Georgine case, which was the subject of the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision in Amchem). 
 214. Professor Koniak outlines the deals as follows: 
Both deals covered people with a wide range of diseases caused by asbestos: 
mesothelioma, lung cancer, and the full range of nonmalignant asbestos diseases—
from disease that seriously affects one’s ability to breathe to disease that leaves marks 
on the lungs but does not result in severe breathing impairment. Although the deals 
covered the same sorts of people with the same sorts of diseases, the deals had 
different terms. For example, it appears that the people covered by the class action 
got considerably less money than the people with the same diseases who were 
covered by the other deal. . . . 
  [The class] excluded over fourteen thousand of [class counsel’s] clients and 
many, if not most, of the clients of other asbestos lawyers. These clients—and their 
lawyers—got the deal with more money. . . . 
  [The defendant asbestos companies] refused to settle the bulk of the existing 
cases without some guarantee about the future. . . . They also wanted control over 
the number of cases they would face each year and, preferably, control over how 
much money they would have to pay out each year. They determined that the best 
way to get what they wanted was through a “settlement class action”—a class action 
put together solely for the purpose of achieving settlement. 
Id. at 1052–53. 
 215. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621 (“Subdivisions (a) and (b) [of Rule 23] focus court 
attention on whether a proposed class has sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be 
bound by decisions of class representatives. That dominant concern persists when settlement, 
rather than trial, is proposed.”). 
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defense counsel proffered,216 and the trial court approved,217 the 
proposed settlement. 
The challenge to the global settlement proceeded all the way to 
the United States Supreme Court, where the parties offered 
arguments based on an aggregate focus, including the burden on 
court dockets caused by asbestos-related litigation and the 
desirability of a global settlement.218 Yet despite the strain on court 
dockets caused by asbestos-related litigation, and despite the 
reluctance of defense counsel to settle without protection against 
future lawsuits, the Supreme Court refused to uphold the global 
settlement, finding adequacy of representation lacking.219 In 
particular, the Court noted that the diversity of interests within the 
class required the use of subclasses: 
In significant respects, the interests of those within the single class 
are not aligned. Most saliently, for the currently injured, the critical 
goal is generous immediate payments. That goal tugs against the 
 
 216. Professor Koniak explains: 
  Why did [the defendants] agree to treat class counsel’s clients and the clients of 
other asbestos lawyers more generously than the class? This generosity was simply 
part of the price [the defendants] had to pay to get the class settlement [they] 
wanted. [The defendants] needed two deals to accomplish [their] goal because 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, including class counsel, would not accept for their own clients the 
terms [the defense] was prepared to offer the largest group of asbestos victims, the 
future claimants. 
  Why would class counsel and [defense counsel] define a class that excluded the 
clients of other asbestos lawyers? Because by offering more generous terms to the 
clients of other asbestos lawyers [the defense] could buy third-party support for the 
settlement among the asbestos bar. The more members of the asbestos bar who 
supported the class settlement, the better [the defendants’] chances would be of 
getting the resolution [they] wanted. The gerrymandered class, the separate client 
settlements, and the substantial differences between the class settlement and the 
inventory settlements can all be explained in this way: [The defense] paid class 
counsel on the side, by which I mean outside the class action proceeding through 
the client settlements, for agreeing to support the class settlement. Or to put it even 
more bluntly, [the defendants] bought off the class lawyers. 
Koniak, Widow Weeps, supra note 211, at 1054–55. 
 217. Id. at 1056 (“Why would a district court accept such a tainted settlement on behalf 
of so many absent class members? To help rid the court system of the terrible burden imposed 
by what appears to be interminable asbestos litigation.”). 
 218. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[T]he need 
for settlement in this mass tort case, with hundreds of thousands of lawsuits, is greater than the 
Court’s opinion suggests.”); see also id. (suggesting that adequacy of representation problems 
are unavoidable and that a well-balanced settlement is less important than a comprehensive 
one). 
 219. Id. at 625. 
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interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation-
protected fund for the future. . . . The settling parties, in sum, 
achieved a global compromise with no structural assurance of fair 
and adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals 
affected. Although the named parties alleged a range of complaints, 
each served generally as representative for the whole, not for a 
separate constituency.220 
As Amchem so dramatically illustrated, when a class action lacks 
adequate representation, lawyers control the lawsuit unchecked, with 
defense lawyers often having disproportionate power and control, 
and with class members often the ultimate losers.221 Without 
adequate representation, “everyone” benefits—everyone, that is, 
except the parties in whose name the action was brought. An 
aggregate approach to class actions places a distorted emphasis on 
convenience and efficiency—on clearing court dockets and reaching 
global settlements—at the expense of basic fairness concerns and 
constitutional due process. The Supreme Court has refused to 
indulge these distractions, repeatedly rejecting an aggregate focus in 
favor of a representative emphasis. 
In rejecting an aggregate focus, and in encouraging the use of 
subclasses, the Supreme Court has insisted on a more individual-
focused approach. Such an individual-focused approach, with its 
emphasis on the representative nature of class actions, may suggest 
the propriety not only of subclasses, but of smaller classes generally. 
Although defendants often prefer global settlements, a less 
comprehensive class definition (or at least more subclasses) greatly 
enhances the likelihood of achieving adequacy of representation—
and seems to have been the Amchem Court’s basic message. 
If class action reality is reconstructed so that the goals of class 
litigation are defined exclusively as judicial economy, resolution, and 
finality, then adequacy of representation will necessarily become 
secondary and expendable. There is no question that, at least under 
some circumstances, rigorous attention to the adequate 
representation of absent class members disrupts, hinders, and delays 
settlement—or may partially unravel an existing settlement. And 
 
 220. Id. at 626–27. 
 221. See Mullenix, supra note 45, at 439 (noting that when class representatives are mere 
figureheads, “plaintiff and defense attorneys . . . become private brokers of private disputes 
without meaningful client input or interaction” and that “most courts simply look the other 
way”). 
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there is no question that judicial economy and efficiency concerns 
are among the ultimate objectives of all litigation, including class 
litigation.222 It is precisely for this reason, however, that the focus is 
so important. An overemphasis on the aggregate nature of class 
actions elevates judicial economy, resolution, and finality to the same 
level as due process—permitting discussions to be framed in terms of 
fairness to defendants. However, the issue is not defendants’ rights 
versus plaintiffs’ rights. Adequate representation is an absolute due 
process prerequisite—without it, there is no valid, binding judgment 
for either plaintiffs or defendants to rely on and enforce. Only a 
representative construction of class action reality maintains this focus. 
In sum, the recent use of the term “aggregate litigation” as a 
synonym-substitute for “class actions” reflects a deeper and more 
troubling trend in the legal literature—a trend that attempts to 
reconstruct class action reality. The difference is more than mere 
word choice—“aggregate litigation” focuses on numbers and 
expediency, whereas adequate representation is the soul of class 
actions, embodying constitutional due process and basic fairness. 
Similarly, recent proposals in the legal literature have emphasized the 
aggregate nature of class actions—despite the fact that an aggregate 
focus undermines the representative nature of class actions. 
Authentic class actions protect absent claimants’ interests and thus 
should distinctly be preserved as a middle ground between the 
extremes of individual adjudication versus a mere aggregate 
resolution. By lumping class actions with other methods that involve 
the disposition of many claims—by rendering class actions just 
another type of “aggregate litigation”—class actions’ unique value 
and unique character as representative actions are lost. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The most compelling feature of the class action is its 
representative nature, enforced through the constitutional due 
process prerequisite of adequate representation. Although the 
efficiencies of aggregation are one part of the class action story—
many class actions indeed bring together large numbers of claims 
into a single lawsuit—efficiency is far from the whole story. Thus, 
 
 222. 1 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 14, § 1:6, at 27–28. 
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this aggregate characteristic is not the distinctive hallmark of the class 
action device. 
Reconstructing class action reality to focus on the aggregate—
and thereby focus on the efficiency concerns of class litigation—is an 
overinclusive approach that detracts from the representative emphasis 
traditionally associated with class actions. Focusing on the aggregate 
emphasizes size and numbers and suggests unwieldiness, leading to 
an undue focus on reducing court dockets, promoting global 
settlements, and limiting the ability to collaterally attack class 
judgments, all of which tend to undermine the rigorous scrutiny of 
adequate representation. 
Reconstructing class action reality to shift the focus from 
representative to aggregate further marginalizes absent class 
members, obscuring and minimizing their role by downplaying the 
fairness integral to a binding class action judgment and by 
emphasizing the disposal of claims. No one questions that clearing 
court dockets, settling cases, and encouraging finality are desirable 
goals. The problem is that a shift to an aggregate focus, despite its 
benefits, gains those benefits at the direct expense of the class 
members for whom ostensibly the litigation was begun. 
 
 
 
 
